Chapter 10 - Geopolitics as an instrument of national policy

10.1 Planetary dualism is the basic law of geopolitics

Summing up a brief acquaintance with the ideas of the founders of geopolitical science, we can draw several general conclusions.

Despite the diversity of points of view, we are still dealing with a certain unified picture of the world, which can be called geopolitical. This picture of the world seeks to include in the analysis of historical processes, international and interstate relations several disciplinary approaches at once geographic, political, ideological, ethnographic, economic, etc. This is the main characteristic of all geopolitical doctrines, the desire for interdisciplinary synthesis.

The most general and common methodological formula shared by all geopoliticians is the assertion of fundamental historical dualism between Susha, Tellurocracy, the “Nomos” of the Earth, Eurasia, heartland, the “Middle Earth”, ideocratic civilization, the “geographical axis of history” on the one hand, and the Sea, thalassocracy , Sea Power, the “nomos” of the Sea, the Atlantic, the Anglo-Saxon world, a commercial civilization, an “external or island crescent,” on the other. This can be considered as the main law of geopolitics. Outside of the postulation of this dualism, all other conclusions lose their meaning. Despite all the differences in particular aspects, not one of the founders of geopolitical science questioned the fact of such a confrontation. In its significance, it is comparable with the law of universal gravitation in physics.

10.2 Geopolitics cannot but be biased

Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant political engagement. In fact, there is not a single geopolitician who would be excluded from participating in the political life of his state. This implies the obvious partiality of all, without exception. When embarking on scientific research, a geopolitician must determine his own place on the map of geopolitical poles; that angle of view from which he will begin to analyze all world processes will depend on this. In the whole history of geopolitics, we do not find a single author who would be indifferent to the fate of his state and his people, would not share his main ethical and historical orientation.This is especially pronounced at the extreme poles of the Anglo-Saxon authors impeccably and unequivocally follow the logic and value system of Sea Power, thalassocracy, formulating their theories from the standpoint of unconditional supporters of Atlantism; Russian Eurasians are just as consistent in their fidelity to the ideals of heartland; they do not even question the absolute ethical and historical superiority of ideocracy and Russia-Eurasia.

The situation is more complicated with the French, who have a theoretical choice of self-identification, either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. In the first case, there follows solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, with Sea Power, in the second Germanophilia. Both options imply unconditional national sympathies. Theoretically, both of these tendencies are present among French geopolitics, but the most coherent geopolitical concept was developed by a group of “Atlantists”, followers of Vidal de la Blach, who remains the central figure in this area. From the theoretical point of view, his geopolitical antipodes Lavalle and De Gaulle are significantly inferior to him.

Germany also has a dual situation. If in general its geopolitical thought is oriented mainly continental and “Eurasian,” this orientation is limited to a complex attitude to the Slavic world, to Asia, and especially to Russia. This restriction is so significant and Germany’s attempts to voluntarily ristically equalize its mid-European position with that of Middle Eurasia, thereby ignoring the historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, are so stubborn that in both world wars Germany was forced to fight not only against the thalassocratic powers, but also against its logical Eurasian ally of Russia (USSR). We can say that "non-Eurasian" continentalism is characteristic of German geopolitics.Such an attitude summarizes the entire German history in a geopolitical formula and predetermines the very structure of German national consciousness.

The need for geopolitics to initially determine their own position on the geopolitical map of the world and its belts (Mackinder's scheme in this sense is an extremely clear illustration) influenced the fact that this science developed almost exclusively among representatives of major powers that have ambitions to become “world power” (Weltmacht) , "superpowers", achieve planetary domination.

Americans Mahan and Speakman, the Englishman Mackinder represent the "island crescent." They are the "speakers" of Atlantism, thalassocracy.

Vidal de la Blach (and his school) represent Atlantic France. Laval and De Gaulle lean towards continentalism, "Europeanism", anti-Atlantism. Hence their mutual Germanophilia, which geopolitically brings them together despite the fact that they belonged to two hostile camps: Laval was the head of the collaborationist government of Vichy, and De Gaulle the head of the anti-fascist French army.

The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, Schmitt identify Germany with the axis of Sushi, Tellurocracy, and strive to create from Germany a "Great Space", which should oppose the Anglo-Saxon thalassocracy. They are adjoined by the Swede Rudolf Chellen, who, however, thinks more as a representative of Central Europe, the German European space, and not as a "narrow-Swedish" nationalist. The most radical continents are Ernst Nikisch, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Brook, etc. go even further and believe the future of Germany only in strategic integration with Eurasian Russia.

Finally, Russian Eurasians (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) express the most complete version of the continent of Lism, expressing the most radical position of the "nomos" of Sushi, Tellurocracy.

The absence of at least some distinguished names among the geopolitics of other countries (although such were also in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania, Holland, etc.) is explained by the fact that the fundamental geopolitical dualism is secondary to the scale of states only indirectly, their influence on the course of the global confrontation is insignificant, and therefore, the very essence of geopolitics, its acuteness, its relevance, its "fateful" dimension are completely irrelevant for them.

10.3 Fates of the learned destinies of powers

The citizenship of geopolitical scientists directly affects their views. Here the connection is obvious. Geopolitics, in essence, are those people who, with the greatest insight and responsibility, are able to recognize the historical trends of global development in the spatial sphere, understand the place of their state and their people in this context, and formulate a reasonable and most effective project for the future. Therefore, so often they directly or indirectly affect world history, which is, however, carried out by completely different forces, groups, parties, leaders, acting under completely different, momentarily relevant slogans.

But another regularity is interesting. The degree of direct influence of geopolitics on power, the feedback between scientific developments and the political course in the international relations of the respective states, varies sharply.

Mahan, Speakman and Mackinder held high posts in their states, their political activity had the most immediate results, their direct influence on Anglo-Saxon politics is obvious and enormous. Despite some friction with the scientific world of their countries and some (tactical) silence of the significance of their ideas for the entire “marine civilization” as a whole, they enjoyed honor during their lifetime, they were given all kinds of support, their fate and career were demonstrably successful.

The situation is different with continental geopolitics. Vidal de la Blach was considered only a geographer, seeking to expand the scope of his research to a political scale. The government’s attitude towards him is respectful, but generally indifferent, although many practical principles (especially those set forth in “East France”) have been adopted. He does not enjoy such prestige as the Anglo-American people, but his theoretical heritage is taken into account.

Among the Germans, especially Haushofer and Schmitt, the situation is already more serious. Both in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, the attitude towards them is changing in waves, passing from a certain attention of the authorities to direct repression. Compared with the “thalassocratic” geopolitics, their fate is tragic, their zigzag careers are different, they are at certain times victims of even those regimes whose national goals in general coincide with their own. There is no longer honor or respect, but hysterical attention, alternating with persecution.

For Eurasians, the picture is even more tragic. There is no direct attention, not a single mention in official sources, only camps, exile, arrests, harassment with complete disregard. And although up to a certain point in Soviet history it seems that the main decisions at the international level are made by the followers of Pyotr Savitsky, checking every step with the publications of the Eurasians, there comes a turning point in 1989 when it turns out that no one in the Soviet leadership is able to coherently explain the logic of traditional foreign policy, and as a result, lightning-fast destruction of the gigantic Eurasian organism takes place, created with such tension by three generations, withstanding wars, deprivations, suffering, and excessive burdens.

The role of the personality of geopolitics in the sense of their influence on power is sharply reduced along the West-East axis. Respect for Mahan and Speakman is contrasted with the constant threats by Schmitt from the SS sheep and the persecution of Haushofer (his son was shot), and to an even greater extent the camps of Savitsky and Karsavin. It is striking that, in the end, it is precisely those countries that listened most to their geopolitics and appreciated them, achieved amazing results and came close to finally achieving sole world domination. Germany paid for inattention to the theses of Haushofer on the “continental bloc” by the fact that for half a century it fell out of history, suffered a terrible defeat and fell into political oblivion. The USSR, which did not pay attention to the works of the most responsible, deep and perspicacious Russian patriots,without a fight and resistance, he found himself in almost the same situation as post-war Germany, the world influence came to naught, the space declined sharply, the economy and social sphere turned into ruins.

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