Secondly, at the geopolitical and strategic level, the USSR was uncompetitive in the long run for resistance to the atlantist western bloc. In terms of strategy, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (the number of border troops, the cost of military equipment, the use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After the Second World War, the USSR was in an unequal position compared with the Western capitalist bloc grouped around the United States. The United States had a gigantic island base (American continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the US controlled almost all coastal zones in the south and west of Eurasia,creating a gigantic threat to the USSR, while remaining virtually out of reach for potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. The division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential adversary, and in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who were held hostage in a geopolitical duel, the meaning of which was not obvious to them. The same thing happened in the southern direction in Asia and the Far East, where the USSR had direct neighbors or controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Homei Iran) or rather hostile powers with a non-Soviet socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could acquire relative stability only in two cases: either rapidly advancing to the oceans in the West (Atlantic) and in the South (Indian Ocean), or creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia that are not controlled by one of the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was still proposed by Stalin, and after his death, Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too big and too small at the same time. Maintaining the status quo was beneficial only to the United States and Atlanticism, as the military, industrial, and strategic potentials of the USSR wore off more and more, and the power of the United States, a protected island, increased. Sooner or later, the Eastern bloc would inevitably collapse. Hence,the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw block is not only almost impossible, but also not necessary, because even in the case of (almost unbelievable) success, it will only lead to the revival of the obviously doomed geopolitical model.