Chapter 4 - Perspectives of civil war

4.1 National interests and the Mondialist lobby

The problem of a possible civil war in Russia is becoming more and more urgent, and today it is necessary to study this terrible issue from an analytical point of view on the other side of both alarmist emotions and pacifist exhortations. Worst of all (if a civil conflict in Russia does break out) is to be completely unprepared for it, confused in a complex and controversial balance of power that can mislead even the most penetrating and ideologically consistent patriots.

In this matter, as in all other important aspects of the political life of the nation and the state, we must begin by recalling the fundamental points that determine the general contours of the current state of the geopolitical situation. The main imperative of the existence of the state and nation is the principle of sovereignty, independence and political freedom. And it is precisely the requirements of national sovereignty that are synonymous with national interests. In the context of the political history of the world, Russia and the Russian people have their own unique place, their mission, their role, and the free and full-fledged fulfillment of the national state mission is the main meaning of the very existence of the people as an organic community.

But we are living in a special era when the state’s internal national policy is inextricably linked with the foreign policy context, and perhaps, never before in history has the external pressure on national-state formations been so strong and persistent. Moreover, the theory of mondialism has become almost the most important doctrine in the modern political establishment of the West such an organization of life of people all over the world, in which there should not be national-state formations, no sovereignty, national interests. The mondialist world community is led by the cosmopolitan elite, which governs not the societies, but the mathematical sum of atomic individuals. Consequently, the mondialist vector is initially oriented against any national-state formations, and its main task is the abolition of the old traditional world, divided into peoples and countries, and the creation of a "new world order", which denies all forms of historical and organic social and social formations.

The Mondialist factor, of course, is directed not only against Russia (other nations and states are also obstacles for it), but it was Russia, as a powerful geopolitical entity, that until recently was the main bastion that impeded the gradual spread of Mondialist control from the West to the whole world. Of course, the Soviet system in its certain aspects also possessed Mondialist features, and one of the projects of the Western Mondialists consisted in the gradual, “evolutionary” inclusion of the USSR in the planetary system of the “new world order”. This well-known theory of convergence, most likely, was the main reference point for those forces that began perestroika. But the soft version of Russia's “mondialization” for one reason or another didn’t work,and then the mondialist policy towards Russia took the form of aggressive pressure and overtly subversive activities. The harsh and superfast collapse of the USSR deprived the proponents of “convergence” of control levers, and the mondialist policy turned to openly aggressive, Russophobic forms.

Mondialist vector is an extremely important point for understanding the current situation of Russia. If earlier external influence on our country was exerted by other national-state formations seeking to weaken the power of the Russian state or to incline it to its side in various international conflicts; if earlier the potential opponents of Russia (obvious and secret) were geopolitical forces, generally comparable in structure to itself, then at present the main external factor has become a special form of pressure that does not have any clear national-state or geopolitical outlines and represents It’s a supranational, global utopian socio-political project, behind which are invisible manipulators, possessing gigantic economic and political power. Sure, traditional foreign policy factors also continue to operate (the Mondialist project has not yet been fully implemented), but their significance and weight pales in comparison with the totality of Mondialist pressure, and fade into the background. For example, Russia's relations with Germany, Japan or China today are not a matter of two parties, but of at least three of Russia, another state and the world mondialist lobby, speaking directly and through their "agents of influence" in political entities, clarifying between themselves bilateral problems. Moreover, it is the “third force”, mondialism, that most often turns out to be decisive, since its means of influence and the structure of influence are incomparably more streamlined and effective than the corresponding mechanisms of the “archaic” national-state formations.

Thus, in Russia, both in domestic and in foreign policy, two fundamental elements can be distinguished that are behind the adoption of certain decisions, the organization of various processes, and the determination of various orientations of Russian political and socio-economic life : these are mondialist “agents of influence” and groups guided by national-state interests. Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that both poles are opposite to each other in the most important thing: some seek to minimize the sovereignty and independence, autarky of Russia (up to its complete abolition in the mondialist cosmopolitan context of the "new world order"), while others, on the contrary, are oriented towards approval, strengthening and expansion of national-state sovereignty,to maximize the removal of the nation from the planetary mondialist structure, hostile, by definition, to the existence of any full-fledged autarky society. Of course, in real politics, these two poles are almost never found in their pure form, most power structures are mixed systems where both trends are present, but, nevertheless, these two poles determine the main power trends that are constant and rigid counteraction veiled by compromises, naivety, near-sightedness or corruption of "uninitiated" extras from politicians.

So, we have identified two poles in the current political picture of Russia. Two different points of view on the possibility of a civil war in Russia correspond to them. And it is precisely these two forces that will ultimately be the main subjects of potential conflict, the main opponents, the main parties, although their confrontation may be hidden under a more private and confused distribution of roles. An example of the first civil war in Russia shows that in this case, national and anti-national forces acted not under their own banners, but under a complex and controversial system of social, political and ideological orientations that hide true geopolitical motives and tendencies. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, we must objectively analyze the terrible prospect of a new civil war, beyond political or ideological sympathies.

4.2 Power balance options

Let us single out the main plots of the civil war in Russia, define the acting forces and direct motivations, and outline its supposed options.

1) The first (and most unlikely) version of the civil war could develop along the line of confrontation: national-state forces against the mondialist lobby .

Indeed, such a separation of roles would be very logical, given the complete incompatibility of the main orientations of both. Mondialists strive in every way to weaken Russia's sovereignty, undermine its economic and political independence, make it dependent on the cosmopolitan mondialist establishment, and deprive it of the ability to freely fulfill its national mission. Nationalists and state officials, on the contrary, want to strengthen autarky, achieve maximum political independence and economic and social self-sufficiency. Naturally, it is impossible to combine these two trends peacefully, since they contradict each other in everything in general and in particular.

However, this version of the civil war ("cosmopolitan against nationalists") generally cannot become nationwide and global, since the mondialist ideology is fundamentally incapable of instilling fanaticism among the masses and raising at least a significant part of the population to defend their ideals. In peaceful conditions, of course, inertia, indifference and general passivity can be auxiliary factors for the Mondialists, but in the event of a bloody conflict, shooting and murder, an appeal to the deeper layers of the human psyche is necessary, fanaticism and sacrifice are necessary. Nationalists, on the contrary, can easily count on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in the event of an open and widespread armed confrontation with the Mondialists, provided, of course, that the conflict becomes national in character,and will not be localized in special centers strictly controlled by the Mondialists.

In other words, the civil war according to the “Mondialist Nationalists” scenario will in any case not become a real and total civil war, since the Mondialists in their pure form do not and will not have a solid ideologically cohesive and politically active foundation capable of organizing the masses to oppose the nationalists. If such a conflict erupted, its outcome would be quick and unambiguous: national-state forces would quickly crack down on the anti-national lobby, designated as such and confronted with the people who had risen behind the patriotic idea. In principle, such a civil war would be almost bloodless and very short, and after the destruction of the Mondialists, the internal source of conflict would be eliminated, and the political and social life of the state would develop strictly within the boundaries of national interests,as is the case in traditional states and nations.

But the mondialist lobby hardly understands its true position and the suicidal nature of such a scenario, which means that it will try to avoid such a turn of events at all costs. That is why this option is almost unbelievable.

2) The second version of the civil war is determined by the formula: the Russian Federation against one (or several) of the republics of the near abroad . This situation can easily arise due to the extreme instability of new state formations in the territory of the former USSR. These states, the vast majority of which have no more or less stable state and national traditions, created within completely arbitrary borders that do not coincide with the ethnic, social, economic, or religious territories of organic societies, will inevitably be cast into deep internal and external crisis.In principle, they will not be able to gain any true sovereignty, since their strategic capabilities do not allow them to defend their independence without resorting to external assistance . The collapse of the political, social, and economic systems in them is inevitable, and naturally, this cannot but affect their attitude both to the Russian (or pro-Russian) population and to Russia itself.

In this case, most likely, it is from their side that Russia will be challenged, to which the Russian Federation will be forced to respond with varying degrees of aggressiveness. This process will most likely be of a chain nature, since an explosion of interethnic or territorial contradictions, affecting Russia and the Russians, will inevitably respond to other former Soviet republics.

Obviously, the national interests of the Russians and the orientation of the Mondialist lobby within Russia (and within the new republics) in this case will not clash directly and openly. The main adversary in such a war will be direct neighbors for the Russians. At the same time, it is absolutely not necessary that the mondialist lobby will play in this case to the defeat of the Russian Federation. Such a conflict, called “low-intensity wars” (or even “medium (!) Intensity”) by American strategists, may well satisfy the interests of the Mondialist lobby if it destabilizes the strategic and geopolitical situation in Russia and, more broadly, Eurasia, becoming local, protracted and ambiguous. In this case, Russian national interests will not necessarily be fulfilled,even if a civil war takes place under patriotic and nationalist slogans. As in the case of Afghanistan, an armed conflict between Russia and neighboring regions will only weaken Russian influence in these states and will undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. Moreover, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (primarily Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy.

Thus, this version of the civil war is controversial and ambiguous. Russian national interests, the imperative of sovereignty, will not necessarily be strengthened in such a development of events, and the mondialist, Russophobic lobby, for its part, can even benefit from this by creating a belt of "low-intensity wars" around the Russian Federation, discrediting Russians internationally and undermining and so shaky social and economic stability of the state. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should not act as a defender of Russian and pro-Russian oriented peoples in the near abroad. But in doing all this, it should especially care about expanding its geopolitical and strategic influence. Even if the Russians manage to win back part of the original Russian lands from their neighbors,the price for this may be the emergence of new hostile states that will be thrown into the camp of the main opponents of Russia, i.e. Mondialists, in which case the new imperial integration needed by Russia will be postponed indefinitely.

3) The third option is similar to the first in its structure, only here a civil war can begin within the framework of the Russian Federation itself between representatives of Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups(3). The scenario may be similar to the previous one: the Russian population is subjected to aggression by foreigners in any national district or internal republic; ethnic solidarity encourages other Russians to take part in the conflict; other national non-Russian regions are drawn into armed confrontation on ethnic grounds; the civil war takes on the character of a "low-intensity war." In this case, this is even more dangerous for Russia, as the result may be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or, at least, provoking ethnic hostility towards Russian foreigners where they can be “suppressed”. At the same time, other state and national entities will inevitably be drawn into the conflict against the Russians, which may make it protracted and long-term.Such a conflict will translate the position of Russians from national-state to narrowly ethnic, which will further narrow the geopolitical quality of Russia, which, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR, has already lost its imperial quality.

This version of the civil war is generally contrary to the national interests of the Russians, since in it, in fact, the further disintegration of the Russian space into ethnic components will be legalized, which in the future will reduce the geopolitical quality of the once imperial people to a purely ethnic, almost "tribal" level. For tough Russophobic mondialism, aimed at undermining Russian national state autarchy, this option would be quite attractive, since it involves instilling in Russians not a state but a narrow ethnic self-identification, which will inevitably narrow Russia's strategic scope. On the other hand, in this case there is a certain risk for the Mondialists, since an explosion of ethnic self-awareness can also hit the "agent of influence". But such a conflict is disadvantageous to Russian patriots on any side.

4) The fourth option is also domestic Russian, but based not on ethnic hatred, but on regional, administrative-territorial contradictions . The centralist policy of Moscow in matters of political, economic and social cannot but provoke a powerful confrontation between the regions, which in the general process of disintegration seek to gain maximum autonomy. Here, as in the case of ethnic friction, the collapse of the Soviet empire deprives the centralist and integration idea of ​​its legitimacy, evidence and attractiveness. In addition, the current policy of the center, adopting the command totalitarian style of the former system, actually abandoned the second half of the center-region relations, which consisted of assistance and social and administrative support.

The center also wants to take and control, as before, but now it actually does not give anything in return. Economically, the regions only lose from this, since the field of their capabilities is narrowing and depends on the center. But the political peculiarity of the regions is added to this, where the anti-national character of the mondialist reforms is felt much more painfully than in the cosmopolitan megacities of the capitals.

The first steps towards separatism by the regions have already been taken, although these attempts were suppressed by the center. However, it is very likely that at some point the Russians in southern Russia, in Siberia or elsewhere will want to create an “independent state” free from the political and economic dictatorship of Moscow. This may be based on purely economic feasibility. The sale of regional resources or locally produced goods bypassing Moscow in some cases can drastically improve the local situation. On the other hand, a "regional revolution" can also put forward political tasks, for example, abandoning the extreme liberal policies of the center, maintaining social guarantees, strengthening the national dimension in ideology. All this makes the possibility of civil conflict at this level quite real. At some point, the regions can seriously insist on their own, which, naturally, will provoke opposition from the center, which does not want to lose control over the territories.

This version of the civil war is no less ambiguous and contradictory, like the two previous ones. Indeed, on the one hand, the demands of the regions wishing to isolate themselves from Moscow, the center of reform, have some features of patriotism and nationalism, and are in the interests of the people; the mondialist forces of the center, speaking out against the regions, will at the same time defend not national, but anti-national interests, since the control of liberals over the entirety of the Russian territories is beneficial, first of all, to the designers of the "new world order". But, on the other hand, regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of Russian state territories, weaken the nationwide power, and prepare the fault lines within the united Russian people. Mondialists can consciously go on to provoke such a conflict if their control over Russia weakens,and in this case, the territorial collapse of the country will be the last step in weakening national-state autarky.

National forces should act in this matter, proceeding from the exact opposite logic. As long as the power of the center is strong, it is necessary to identify with regional requirements, supporting their desire for autonomy from the center. But at the same time, from the very beginning, the need for strategic and political integration of all regions based on the prospects for the reconstruction of the empire should be emphasized. As the mondialist lobby in the center weakens, patriots should gradually change their orientation, insist on the inadmissibility of a civil conflict, and urge the regions to unite.

Be that as it may, the civil war on a regional basis can in no way correspond to national interests, as well as the two previous scenarios.

The next point should be specifically noted. The fifth version of the civil war suggests itself, in which the forces would be distributed not according to ideological, national and territorial, but according to socio-economic grounds, for example, “new rich” versus “new poor”. In principle, such an option is not excluded, and in the future all the preconditions for it may develop. But in the current state of society, the purely economic factor is obviously not dominant. Despite the terrible economic cataclysms, the general impoverishment of the working strata and the grotesque enrichment of the “new Russians,” Russian society has not yet formulated its demands in economic terms. Geopolitical, national, ideological aspects are incomparably more effective and relevant.It is they who are able to withdraw the masses in the square and make them take up arms. The economic crisis serves as an excellent background for civil conflict, it can serve as an impetus for cataclysms in certain cases, but other non-economic theses will be the main lines of force. Appeals to the nation, ethnos, patriotism, freedom today are able to relativize the purely material side of life, to make it secondary. But even in the case where the material side is dominant, it, by virtue of discrediting the Marxist and socialist doctrines, will not be able to express its demands in the form of a consistent and fiery political ideology. Most likely, the economic factor in possible conflicts will be a concomitant rather than a determining category.

4.3 Summary of analysis

The civil war in Russia, unfortunately, is possible. The fundamental contradictions between national-state interests and the plans of mondialism can hardly be resolved peacefully and amicably. In order to seriously talk about a "consensus" or "truce" between these forces, it is necessary either to completely destroy the bearers of national-state tendencies (and this is possible only together with the destruction of the Russian state and the Russian nation), or to end representatives Mondialist lobby.

That is why, the outbreak of a civil war in Russia or the creation of a belt of "low intensity wars" on its territory can at any time become the main project of the Mondialist lobby. At the same time, there is no doubt that the representatives of this lobby will try their best to stay in the shade themselves, speaking under some other banner (both separatist and centralist).

Three variants of the civil war of the Russian Federation against the near abroad, the Russian population of the Russian Federation against foreigners, the regions against the center are fundamentally unacceptable to all those who are really concerned about the national-state interests of Russia and the Russian people. All three of these options are fraught with a further split in the geopolitical and strategic space of Russia, even if certain territories come under Russian control. Consequently, the patriots must prevent a civil war in these three scenarios in any way. Not to mention that from a moral point of view, it is not beneficial to them. And if this is so, then it is logical to assume that it is the Mondialists who will have a hand in provoking such conflicts (if they start to flare up).

For the Mondialist lobby, something similar to the civil war in Russia could be beneficial for several more reasons. The outbreak of a military conflict with the direct participation of Russians would allow liberals from the center to:

1. Introduce a political dictatorship under the pretext of "saving the fatherland" and forcibly get rid of political opponents;

2. Write off the economic collapse to war and force the economy to function under the direct control of the center;

3. Distract public attention from the activities of the "reformers" , which is becoming dangerously obvious today;

4. Knowingly suppress a possible future union of Russians with neighboring national-state Eurasian and European entities under the sign of continental solidarity against the Atlantic domination of the West and mondialist projects.

All this leads us to believe that the carriers of the hard version of mondialism in Russia will sooner or later resort to a "civil war", especially if the position of the liberal regime becomes more and more precarious. It is important to note that in this case, “structural adjustment” will necessarily occur within the mondialist lobby itself, and part of it will appear under patriotic, and perhaps even nationalist and chauvinistic slogans.

It is difficult to say exactly when the first explosions can occur. It depends on many spontaneous and artificial factors. But even if nothing of the kind happens for a while, the potential threat of such a turn of events will be more than relevant since the mondialist lobby not only exists in Russia, but also controls the most important levers of state-political power.

Only the first version of the “civil war” Mondialists against nationalists could be short, almost bloodless and beneficial for patriots, for Russia. Moreover, a direct clash of the nation with its internal enemies would inevitably give victory to the national forces. In fact, this would not be a “civil war” in the full sense of the word, but a short flash of active confrontation, as a result of which the possibility of a full-fledged civil war, if not completely destroyed, would be postponed indefinitely. But for this it is necessary to provoke the Mondialist lobby to appear under its own banners, and on behalf of the clearly identified and precisely named Russians of national state interests, patriotic forces should also unite. This is certainly not easy to do (almost impossible). On the one hand, the Mondialists themselves are not so naive as to publicly talk about hatred of the country in which they operate and their desire to destroy it, but on the other hand, representatives of national-state forces are often not able to intelligently and consistently, but at the same time, briefly and convincingly, formulate the foundations of their ideological position. This is hindered by the adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, increased emotionality, poor ability to analytical thinking, ignoring the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc.

A genuine civilian world cannot be based on compromise if the two sides of this compromise are in all direct opposites. As long as the mondialist value system is dominant, then all its flanks are right, left, centrists, with all the differences, do not cast doubt on the general orientation. Yes, in such a situation, "peace" is possible, but at the cost of the death of the state and the radical exclusion of national forces from the dialogue. If the national-state system of values ​​becomes dominant, then we can talk about a compromise between the national capitalists, national socialists, national communists, national monarchists or national theocrats, but also in this case, anti-national, mondialist, Russophobic forces will be excluded from the dialogue, ideologically placed outside the law.

Our society is fraught with a terrible civil conflict. If we still have the ability to influence the course of events, to choose, then we must choose the lesser of evils.