Chapter 1 - Geopolitics of orthodoxy - Foundations of Geopolitics

 1. 1 East and West Christian eikumena
The most significant point in determining the geopolitical specifics of Orthodoxy is that we are talking about the Eastern Church . Within the boundaries of the Christian world, before the discovery of America, which geographically coincided with the northwest of the Eurasian continent, the Middle East and North Africa, a demarcation line is clearly traced between the Orthodox space and the Catholic space. This division, of course, is not a historical accident. The Orthodox world is spiritually and qualitatively related to the East, while Catholicism is a purely Western phenomenon. And if this is so, then the theological formulations themselves, which lay at the basis of the final separation of the churches in 1054, should contain elements of a geopolitical nature. 
The dispute about the filioque, i.e. about the descent of the Holy Spirit only from the Father or from the Father and the Son (1), in theological terms, anticipates the further development of two types of Christian and post-Christian civilizations of the rationalistic-individualistic western and mystical-collectivist eastern. The adoption by the West of an amendment to the Nicene Creed regarding the "filioque" finally consolidated the orientation towards the rationalistic theology of the so-called "subordinateism", i.e. on the introduction into the Divine reality of hierarchically subordinate relations that belittle the mysterious and superintelligent nature of the Trinity. 
In parallel with the question of the filioque, an important point of disagreement was the idea of ​​the supremacy of the Roman throne and the highest theological authority of the Pope. It was also one of the consequences of Catholic "subordinateism", insisting on a strict, straightforward hierarchy even in those matters that are under the sign of the providential action of the Holy Spirit to save the world. Such a position completely contradicted the idea of ​​linguistic autonomy of the local Churches and, in general, the ultimate freedom in the field of spiritual realization, traditional for Orthodoxy. 
And finally, the last and most important aspect of the separation of churches into Eastern and Western was the rejection by Rome of the patristic teachings about the Empire, which is not just a secular administrative apparatus, roughly subordinate to the church authorities, as the Pope wanted to imagine, but a mysterious soteriological organism, actively participating in the eschatological drama as “an obstacle to the coming of the Antichrist,” “catechon,” “holding,” as indicated in the Second Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians. 
The superintelligence of Divine action (the primacy of apophatic mystical theology), the spiritual and linguistic freedom of the local churches (going back to the glossolalia of the apostles on the day of Pentecost) and the doctrine of the sacred role of the Empire and emperors (the theory of the Orthodox symphony) are the main points that determine the specifics of Orthodoxy in contrast to Catholicism, actually denying these aspects of Christianity. 
All these differences were noticeable long before the final break, but it was possible to maintain a certain balance until 1054. From that moment on, the geopolitical dualism of Christian ecumenism was fully determined, and both the Orthodox and Catholic worlds went their own ways. 
Until 1453 (the date the Turks took Constantinople), the Orthodox Church geopolitically identified itself with the fate of the Byzantine Empire. The world of Catholicism swept Western Europe. Until that time, Rome and Constantinople were two Christian “large spaces” (in geopolitical terminology) with their geopolitical, political, economic and cultural interests, as well as with a clearly fixed and unambiguous theological specificity, reflecting and predetermining the difference between churches and all intellectual dogmatic uniqueness and logical relationship. The West was based on the rationalistic theology of Thomas Aquinas, the East continued the line of mystical theology, apophaticism and monastic clever work,most strikingly embodied in the texts of the great Athos hesychast St. Gregory Palamas. 
 The Palamas against Thomas Aquinas is a theological formula reflecting the essence of the geopolitical dualism of the Christian East and Christian West. The mystical contemplation of the Tabor light, the symphony of authorities and the liturgical glossolalia of the local churches (Orthodoxy) are against rational theology, papal dictatorship in the worldly affairs of European kings and the dominance of Latin as the only sacred liturgical language (Catholicism). There is a geopolitical confrontation between two worlds that have a multidirectional cultural orientation, psychological dominance and a different, specific political structure. 
This is the most general outline of the foundations of Orthodox geopolitics. Obviously, in such a situation, the main task of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church was to maintain its structure, protect the limits of its political and spiritual influence, and defend its independence. Moreover, Orthodoxy in this situation had two main geopolitical opponents: 
1) the non-Christian world , whose pressure was manifested both in the raids of the barbarians on the outskirts of the empire, and in the massive pressure of the Islamized Turks;
2) the Christian world of the West , regarded not only as the land of the "Latin heresy", but also as a world of apostasy, apostasy, as a country of people who knew the truth and salvation, but abandoned them, betrayed them. 
In such an initial and complete picture of the geopolitical place of Orthodoxy, it is very easy to discern all those geopolitical problems that the Eastern Church and Orthodox states will worry for many centuries after the collapse of Byzantium. The Byzantine emperors at some point faced the double threat of the Turkish Turban or Latin Miter ". Given the peculiarity of the theological attitude towards the West and Rome, it is easy to understand those Orthodox who opted for the" Turkish turban "in cases where the third was not given. By the way, many Orthodox perceived the fall of Constantine Field as God's punishment for the geopolitical step of Byzantium , which tried to draw closer to Rome by adopting a filioque in the so-called Florence Union (although this recognition was denounced upon the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople). 
 1.2 Post-Byzantine Orthodoxy
After the fall of Constantinople, the whole geopolitical picture changed dramatically. Despite the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the head of the Orthodox Church, the harmony of the whole structure was disrupted. Recall that one of the cornerstones of Orthodoxy was the doctrine of the soteriological function of the Empire, and since the Orthodox Empire (and, accordingly, the Orthodox Emperor, Vasilevs) no longer existed, the Church was forced to enter a new, special and rather paradoxical period its existence. From that moment on, the entire Orthodox world is divided into two parts, which have profound differences not only from a geopolitical, but also from a theological point of view.
The first sector of the post-Byzantine Orthodox world is represented by those Churches that find themselves in the zone of political control of non-Orthodox states, especially in the Ottoman Empire. These churches administratively entered until the collapse of this empire in the so-called Orthodox "millet", which included Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians and Arabs. The Patriarch of Constantinople was considered the supreme figure among these Orthodox, although along with him there were the Patriarch of Alexandria (the archpastor of Orthodox Greeks and Arabs living in Egypt) and the Patriarch of Antioch (the head of the Orthodox Arabs in the territory of modern Syria, Iraq Lebanon). The small Jerusalem Patriarchate, as well as the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Mount Sinai, had special status.The Patriarchate of Constantinople was considered to be spiritually dominant in the entire Orthodox world, although there is no such direct hierarchy as in Catholicism, and the autocephalous churches had a significant share of independence (2). The Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in the Phanar quarter, and from this word comes the collective name of the Greek clergy, subordinate to this Patriarchate "fanariots". Note that since 1453 this sector of the Orthodox world has been in an ambiguous position both at the geopolitical and theological levels, since the absence of Orthodox statehood directly affects the eschatological vision of Orthodox political history and means the Church’s presence in the world as in a “sea of ​​apostasy", where nothing is stopping the mystical coming of the "son of perdition".The inevitable rejection of the Orthodox symphony by the authorities turns the Greek Orthodox Church (and other political destinies, the churches associated with it) into something other than what it was originally. This means that its theological and geopolitical orientations are changing. Its sacred nature is also changing. 
A clear understanding of the relationship between theology and politics in a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine made Russia embark on the path that it has followed since the 15th century, and which is closely connected with the theory of "Moscow of the Third Rome." Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church are the second sector of post-Byzantine Eastern Christianity, which has a completely different geopolitical and even spiritual nature. 
The establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia and the proclamation of Moscow as the "Third Rome" is directly related to the mystical fate of Orthodoxy as such. Russia after the fall of Constantinople remains the only onegeopolitical "large space", where there was an Orthodox policy and the Orthodox Church. Russia becomes the successor of Byzantium both for theological reasons and at the geopolitical level. Only here all three basic parameters were preserved that made Orthodoxy what it was, in contrast to the Latin West and the political domination of non-Christian regimes. Consequently, together with the mystical status of “a barrier to the arrival of the son of perdition,” Moscow inherited the full geopolitical problems of Constantinople. Like Byzantium, Russia was faced with two hostile geopolitical realities with the same "Latin Miter" and the same "Turkish Turban." But in this case, the fullness of historical responsibility fell on the Russian tsars, the Russian church and the Russian people.The fact that this responsibility was transferred to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople endowed the whole situation with special eschatological drama, reflecting not only on the psychology of Russians in the last five centuries, but also on the specific geopolitical orientation of the Russian state and the Russian Church. In parallel to this, the concept of the Russian people as a "people-bo bearer" was formed. 
But at the same time, a new problem appeared: relations with the Orthodox world beyond the borders of Russia and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople as applied to the Patriarch of Moscow. The fact is that non-Russian Orthodox faced a dilemma: either recognize Russia as the "ark of salvation", the new "Holy Land", "catechon" and, accordingly, submit to the spiritual authority of Moscow, or, on the contrary, deny the possibility of the existence of an "Orthodox kingdom" as such and treat Moscow as an illegitimate usurpation of the Byzantine eschatological function. According to this choice, Moscow was also to build its relations with other churches. We can say that, in fact, from that moment on, the Orthodox world was divided into two parts, which differ both geopolitically and theologically. It is known that the anti-Moscow line won in the Constantinople sphere of influence, which means that the clergy of the fanariots adapted the Orthodox doctrine to those conditions when there was no question of political projection. In other words, Greek Orthodoxy changed its nature, turning from an integral spiritual-political doctrine into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry of Constantinople with Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between the two versions of the full-fledged Orthodoxy, in the case of Moscow, and reduced, in the case of Constantinople. 
Moreover, changes in the quality of Greek Orthodoxy brought him, in a sense, closer to the line of Rome, since one of the three main points of dogmatic contradictions (the question of "catechon") fell away by itself. The spiritual rapprochement of the fanariots with the Vatican was accompanied by their political rapprochement with the Turkish administration, in which many Orthodox Greeks traditionally held high posts. Such a split existence, coupled with rivalry with the Russian Church for influence over the Orthodox world, in fact, deprived Greek Orthodoxy of an independent geopolitical mission, making it only one of the secondary geopolitical factors in the more general non-Orthodox context of the political intrigues of the Ottoman authorities and papal legates. 
Be that as it may, from the 15th century the term "geopolitics of Orthodoxy" has become almost identical to the term "geopolitics of Russia". 
At the same time, it would be wrong to consider the whole non-Russian Orthodox world as controlled by the politics of the fanariots. In its various parts, opposing sentiments also existed, recognizing Orthodox theological and eschatological primacy for Orthodox Russia. This was especially true for Serbs, Albanians, Romanians, and Bulgarians, whose Russophile and Fanariotic geopolitical tendencies traditionally competed. This manifested itself with all its strength in the 19th century, when the Orthodox peoples that were part of the Ottoman Empire made desperate attempts to restore their national and political independence. 
 1.3 Petersburg period
But between the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of the struggle for the independence of the Orthodox Balkan peoples, an event occurred that is of great importance for Orthodoxy in the broadest sense. We are talking about the Russian schism and the reforms immediately following it of Peter the Great. At that moment, a qualitative change in the status of Orthodoxy took place in Russia, and from now on the dogmatic foundations of the Eastern Church, which remained unshakable for about 200 years, were shaken. The fact is that the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg and the abolition of the Patriarchate together with the establishment of the Synod meant that Russia ceased to be a dogmatically legitimate Orthodox Empire in the theological and eschatological sense. In fact, a transition was made from the Orthodox Orthodox geopolitical model to a kind of Protestant state.From now on, Russian Orthodoxy also turned into a kind of ambiguous reality, which only partially coincided at the geopolitical level with the Russian State. But although the dogmatic background was frankly shaken, the general logic of Russian geopolitics continued the initial line, although at a different level, as secular and purely political interests began to clearly dominate religious and eschatological issues. In parallel, and in the West itself, the traditional Catholic model also gave way to the strengthening of purely national-political formations, state-nations, so that theological issues were erased there and faded into the background in the face of more practical, mercantile and narrowly political interests. However, the geopolitical alignment, predetermined dogmatically in the schism of the churches, remained totally the same,except for the appearance of Protestant countries. 
Protestantism is geopolitically divided strictly into two sectors: Prussian Lutheranism and Anglo-Swiss-Goland Calvinism. With the outward similarity and synchronism of both outbursts of protest against Rome, Lutheranism and Calvinism are almost polar opposite. The Lutheran camp, which concentrated in the Prussian state, was based both dogmatically and mystically on criticizing the Vatican from the point of view of radicalizing the premises of the New Testament, and in general terms it reproduced the traditional claims to Catholicism for Orthodoxy. Lutheran Prussia was also geographically located between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Western Europe. Calvinism, which became the state religion of England (and later greatly influenced the political system in the USA), was based, on the contrary,on the emphasized Old Testament approach and criticism of Rome from these positions. It is no coincidence that geographically Calvinism and the sects arising from it gravitated toward the extreme West both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic. 
The post-Petrine Russia of the Romanovs was closer to the Prussian model, i.e. departing from the Orthodox dogma proper, she stopped halfway to Catholicism, which, moreover, was gradually losing ground to the nation-states. At the same time, the main geopolitical tension was concentrated between Russia, on the one hand, and the Austrian Empire and the British Empire, on the other. At the religious level, this was a confrontation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism (Austria) and Calvinism (England). Absolutist, and then revolutionary France played a special role in all this, trying to spread republican ideas and Enlightenment. It is important to note that if Russia had some common geopolitical interests with Austria (in particular, the confrontation of Turkey),then the strategy of England was in almost everything contrary to the strategy of Russia, right up to our support of the Ottoman Empire by the English.
Be that as it may, even post-Petrine Russia inherited the basic features of Byzantine geopolitics, although the dogmatic completeness of the concept of the Third Rome was violated. From now on, it was possible to speak only about the inertial continuation of what was once a full-fledged and theologically sound way of the "God-bearing people" in history. Parallel to this transformation, material and narrowly political interests began to play an increasingly important role in foreign policy, and religious factors themselves were often used as an excuse for a particular political course, focused solely on the good of the state in its secular aspect. 
 1.4 National Liberation of Orthodox Peoples
In the 19th century, many Orthodox peoples were Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, etc. began to actively free themselves from the political control of the Turks. The religious factor played a significant role in this, turning into one of the main motives of the national liberation struggle. 
The emergence of new Orthodox states and the destruction of the Ottoman empire was the result of several geopolitical and ideological factors: 
1) The degradation of the political power of the Turks allowed the national feeling of the Greeks and other Balkan peoples to develop, which, in turn, contributed to the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment; in this important role was played by France, the cradle of "modernist trends." 
2) Russia, as a geopolitical opponent of Turkey, actively used the situation to undermine its enemy from the inside; Russian agents in Greece and the Balkans concentrated their efforts on supporting the demands of the Orthodox, which was also accompanied by external geopolitical pressure from Russia. 
3) A peculiar religious renaissance of the Orthodox peoples began, and the idea of ​​a struggle for political and national independence was accompanied by messianic forebodings of an eschatological nature. 
During this period, political and ideological concepts of Greater Greece (or the Great Idea, Megale idea), Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia ("tracing"), Greater Romania, etc. were formed. 
 1.5 Megale Idea
Supporters of Great Greece sought to completely conquer the Greek territories from the Turks and recreate the "New Byzantium", restore tsarist power and return the Patriarch of Constantinople to his dominant role in the entire Orthodox world. Due to the fierce struggle and national uprising, the Greeks were able to win back in 1830 a small independent state around the Pelopones and Morea, which after the Balkan Wars in 1913 actually doubled its territory. At the same time, the implementation of the Great Idea encountered the geopolitical interests of other Orthodox peoples, since the Greeks demanded the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace, and other territories, which were also claimed by the Bulgarians and Serbs. The culmination of this plan was the liberation of Constantinople (Istanbul) from the Turks.But the whole project ended in disaster after the defeat of Greece in the war with Turkey Atatürk, who defeated the Greeks and forced the Greek population of Anatolia to relocate to Greek lands in a massive way. 
It is very important to note that the national liberation struggle of the Greeks was not at all welcomed or inspired by the Phanariotic clergy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, who were politically in solidarity with the Ottoman Empire rather than with Russian geopolitics or the Balkan peoples striving for freedom. Moreover, the collapse of the Turkish empire was a disaster for the spiritual supremacy of the fanariots in the Orthodox world outside of Russia. Therefore, Greek nationalism and the Great Idea, although they had a distinctly Orthodox character, were initially promoted by some special secret organizations of the Masonic type, in which the Russian agents of influence and at the same time supporters of the French Enlightenment played. In other words,The Orthodox idea in Greece during the critical period of its liberation from Turkish domination was the property of a parallel religious structure associated with the Greek diaspora in Russia and other Mediterranean regions. It is also curious that the Greek aristocracy, genetically and politically associated with the Fanariots, after gaining independence, was oriented more towards Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in the midst of which the Great Idea matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this again, a certain solidarity of official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly distinguishable.
 1.6 "Drawing"
The idea of ​​Greater Serbia, based on the historical precedent of a huge Balkan state created in the XIV century by the Serbian dynasty of Nemanic, was revived again during the Serbian liberation struggle. Initially, the rebellious Serbs liberated a small territory, Shumadiyya, from Ottoman rule, and after that they began the struggle to create an independent Slavic state in the Balkans, with the domination of the Serbs and the Orthodox dynasty. Since 1815, the Serbs achieved some independence, which, however, brought with it two different geopolitical orientations, embodied in the two Serbian dynasties of Obrenović and Karageorgievich. The Obrenovichi, although they were Orthodox, focused on close Austria, and the activity of some political and intellectual circles from Vojvodina, the territory, played an important role in this matter.closest to Austria. Karageorgievichi, on the contrary, gravitated exclusively to Russia. In 1903, not without the participation of Russian special services, the Obrenovic dynasty was overthrown, and Serbia turned to the pro-Russian line. By 1920, Yugoslavia was created under Karageorgy Vichy, a huge Balkan state, uniting many Balkan peoples under Serbian rule, including Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Macedonians, Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians. In addition, in the north of Yugoslavia, Hungarian Catholics fell under Serbian control. However, this geopolitical construction turned out to be unstable, since the non-Orthodox peoples of Yugoslavia (not without the help of Austrian and Turkish agents of influence) began to resist the ethnic domination of the Serbs and the religious primacy of Orthodoxy. This confrontation reached particular intensity during the Second World War,when pro-German Croatia and Bosnia actually carried out the genocide of the Orthodox Serbs. 
 1.7 Greater Romania
The project of Greater Romania also appeared in the Orthodox community, and it was not only about the complete liberation from Turkish control (although Moldova and Wallachia were never officially part of the Ottoman Empire), but also about opposing the politics of the fanariots, who sought to subordinate the Romanian clergy to their influence. In this current, anti-Turkish and anti-fanatical sentiments were supported by Russia, which was facilitated by the fact that they belonged to the Russian territories of Bessarabia, populated by Romanians. At the same time, in Romania, from the 18th century, the Uniate tendencies intensified. Unity is the idea of ​​subordinating the Orthodox Church to the Vatican while maintaining Orthodox rituals, but, in fact, the Vatican wins geopolitically exclusively, and Orthodoxy clearly loses. It is no coincidence therefore,that Uniatism was seen by the Orthodox as a tactical move of Catholicism, seeking to expand its missionary, political and spiritual influence in the East at the expense of the Orthodox peoples. And in Romania itself, the Uniate, especially prevalent in Transylvania, was initially accompanied by cultural tendencies of Latinization, the glorification of the Romanesque essence of Romania, the Latin roots of the language, etc. Uniatism in Romania relied on Catholic Austria, and Orthodoxy was naturally supported by Russia. It is significant that the Greek Orthodox, fanariots, carried out in Romania, in fact, a pro-Turkish policy that contradicted both Austro-Catholic and Russian-right glorious geopolitical interests. The idea of ​​Greater Romania had an unambiguously Orthodox subtext, and under this banner the Romanians fought for national independence. It’s importantthat Romanian nationalism has an openly anti-Greek character, and in the confessional sphere, Uniatism, coupled with an orientation toward Latin culture, gravitates toward Rome and Western Europe, while Romanian Orthodoxy follows the pro-Moscow line. It is interesting that after the Sovietization of Romania in 1948, the formally atheistic communist regime took unequivocally the position of Romanian Orthodoxy, subjugating the Uniate faiths and subjecting Catholic minorities to certain repressions.
 1.8 Greater Bulgaria
The beginning of the movement of the Orthodox and at the same time national revival of the Bulgarians can be dated to 1870, when, under pressure and with the support of Russia, the Bulgarian exarchate was created with the goal of uniting the Orthodox living in the Balkans into a geopolitical bloc politically hostile to the Ottoman Empire and spiritually opposing the Patriarchate of Constantinople and dominance of fanariots. 
In parallel with gaining geopolitical independence, Bulgaria developed the nationalist project “Bulgaria of the Three Seas,” which implied the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace, and Constantinople. Being traditionally Russophile, Bulgarian Orthodoxy at some points in history deviated from this line in order to achieve narrowly national goals, and like the Uniates of Romania, the Obrenovic dynasty in Serbia, the Greek aristocracy and some other Eastern European forces, sided with Central Europe. speaking as an ally of Austria-Hungary against Russia. 
Interestingly, as new Orthodox states emerged in the Balkans, their geopolitical orientation constantly fluctuated between Russia and Austria, i.e. between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Moreover, some disputed territories and, first of all, Macedonia were the formal reason for such sustainable dualism. Because of Macedonia, tensions between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia constantly arose, and Russia's support for one side or another in this conflict automatically threw the opposite side into the arms of Austria. 
 1.9 Orthodox Albania
According to the resettlement of the Albanians, there passed the traditional border between the Byzantine and Catholic world. There are 4 faiths in this nation: Sunni Albanians (ousted Albanians), Bektashi Albanians (members of a Sufi organization, which, as in some exceptional cases, has a clan, and not just an initiative character), Catholic Albanians, and Orthodox Albanians. Despite the fact that Orthodox Albanians are a minority, it was this group that stood at the center of the national liberation struggle, and the independent state of Albania arose thanks to the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli, who became the first Albanian ruler in 1918. Fan Noli was an unambiguous supporter of Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy actively supported him in all endeavors. Orthodox Albanians united under their control the whole nation, regardless of faith,but their main opponents and rivals were not so much Catholics as Greek Orthodox clergy, traditionally rooted in Albania! And again, using the example of Albania, we are faced with geopolitical dualism in the post-Byzantine Orthodox world, where the geopolitical interests of the Greek and Russian Churches are opposed.
Fan Noli retained his pro-Russian orientation after the October Revolution, for which he was overthrown by Ahmed Zog, the future king of Albania. During the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy, the Albanian Orthodox were persecuted by the pro-Catholic authorities, but after “Sovietization” the Orthodox Church again received state support now from the communist authorities. Only in 1967 during the “cultural revolution” and the Maoist deviation did Soviet Albania declare itself “the first exclusively atheistic state in the world” and began direct persecution of believers of any faiths. 
 1.10 Geopolitical lobbies in Orthodox countries
A general overview of the geopolitical trends of the Balkan Orthodox countries reveals the most important pattern: in each such state there are at least two geopolitical lobbies, the nature of which is associated with some religious features. 
Firstly, there is a pro-Russian lobby everywhere, focusing on the geopolitics of the Russian Orthodox Church, which, in turn, inherits (albeit with reservations) the line "Moscow the Third Rome." This lobby is oriented against Rome and any rapprochement with it (and therefore against Austria, Hungary and Catholic Germany, that is, against the Catholic sector of Central Europe), but at the same time, it is in anti-Turkish and anti-“fanariotic” positions, opposing itself to one degree or another, the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In some cases (as, for example, in Greece itself), this lobby includes not only Orthodox circles, but also some secret Masonic-type societies. 
Secondly, in the same countries there is an opposite lobby, which, whether or not Orthodox, sympathetically refers to rapprochement with Rome, to orientation towards Central Europe, Austria, to the extent of Uniatism or even Catholicism. 
Thirdly, everywhere there are traces of Turkish influence, which was supported by England in this region, which means that Anglo-Saxon geopolitics in this case has a southern orientation and is based on fanariot tendencies in modern Orthodoxy in the Balkan countries, traditionally associated with the Ottoman administration. 
The collapse of Yugoslavia gives us an example of the geopolitical alignment in the Balkans. The Russophile line is embodied in the position of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia and Slovenia are oriented towards Central Europe, and the Anglo-Saxons (USA and England) actively support Bosnian Muslims, the heirs of the Turks. At the same time, the question of Macedonia again arises, about which disputes arise again between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Albanian problem, in particular in Kosovo, is making itself felt with renewed vigor. The Transnistrian tragedy and anti-Russian sentiments in present-day Romania and Moldova again force us to pay special attention to the Uniate and pro-Catholic lobby, which alone can be the bearer of anti-Moscow sentiments and Latin trends in these areas. 
 1.11 Russian Orthodox Church and Councils
The relationship between Orthodoxy and the Soviet regime is an extremely difficult question. On the one hand, there is a point of view that the Soviet period, in spite of everything, inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a geopolitical line that strictly coincided in the most important aspects with the geopolitics of the Russian Church. You can arbitrarily define this as "Sergianism" by the name of Patriarch of Moscow Sergius, who formulated the famous thesis, which became the starting point of intramural disputes that have not subsided today : "Your successes are our successes"(in reference to the atheistic anti-Christian regime of I. Stalin). This" Sergian "formula is far from as paradoxical and monstrous as Orthodox conservatives want to imagine. The fact is that the Bolshevik Revolution brought about such changes in the church life of Russia that The Patriarchate was restored synchronously, the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of ​​“Moscow the Third Rome”), the miraculous acquisition of the “Sovereign” icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of Russian tsars, marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the tsarist government restored in its supernatural dimension after the bicentennial of the St. Petersburg period.At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited all of Russian geopolitics,strengthened the state and expanded its borders. At the same time, there was a spiritual renewal of the Church, through persecution and suffering, which restored the forgotten fiery religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. 
The second point of view considers Soviet Russia as the complete antithesis of Orthodox Russia, and considers “Sergianism” conformism with antichrist and apostasy. This approach excludes the possibility of considering the Soviet period as a continuation of the geopolitics of Orthodoxy. The bearer of such an ideology in its most distinct form is the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the sectarian True Orthodox Church, whose positions stem from the eschatological identification of Bolshevism with the advent of antichrist. It is curious that this approach refuses Orthodoxy in the political dimension and typologically coincides with the position of “fanariots” who deny the need for the Orthodox Church to be related to politics, which is the basis of a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine. At the same time, this approach is combined with sympathy for the "white"the movement, which was geopolitically based on the support of the Entente, West European and, especially, Anglo-Saxon countries. And it is no accident that the center of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is located in the USA. Geopolitically, such “Orthodox” anti-Sovietism and “anti-Sergianism” coincide with the traditional for the West atlantist line directed against Russia (Soviet, tsarist, patriarchal, modernist, democratic, etc.) regardless of its ideological system.directed against Russia (Soviet, tsarist, patriarchal, modernist, democratic, etc.) regardless of its ideological system.directed against Russia (Soviet, tsarist, patriarchal, modernist, democratic, etc.) regardless of its ideological system. 
 1.12 Summary
After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the geopolitics of Orthodoxy was deprived of the unambiguous theological and eschatological function that it had in the era of the "millennial kingdom" from the 5th to the 15th centuries. Two hundred years of “Moscow of the Third Rome” adjoin this “holy” period, which for the Orthodox consciousness is not identical with the period of a full Tradition. After the split and Peter's reforms, a more ambiguous period begins, throughout which Russia nevertheless follows, in the most general terms, the previous geopolitical line, while losing its doctrinal rigor. The entire post-Byzantine period is characterized by dualism within the framework of Orthodoxy itself, where Russian Orthodoxy, directly connected with the geopolitics of the Russian State, opposes the Greek-Phanariotic line of the Patriarchate of Constantinople,which embodies the type of Orthodoxy, strictly separated from political realization and performing instrumental functions in the overall structure of the Ottoman system. 
Russia itself is adopting the Byzantine tradition of confrontation with the “Latin Miter and the Turkish Turban” and is forced to defend the interests of Orthodoxy alone at the geopolitical and state levels. This line forces Russia to participate in Balkan politics, where it is confronted with a number of geopolitically hostile tendencies, including constant “fanariotic” anti-Russian influence. 
And finally, in the Soviet period, geopolitics, paradoxically as it may, continues the general planetary strategy of Russian Statehood, expanding the sphere of influence of Russia at the expense of countries and peoples traditionally hostile to the Orthodoxy. Of course, there can be no talk of the dogmatic continuity of the Soviets in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, but one should not forget that dogmatic evidence was hopelessly lost already under Peter, and shaken during the split. And if one takes the point of view of “Sergianism,” one can consider the geopolitical successes of the Soviet superpower, which conquered half the world, traditionally hostile to Russian Orthodox Christians and our state, as the successes of the Russian Church and Orthodox geopolitics. This last thesis is, without a doubt, very controversial, but equally controversial is, strictly speaking,identification of Romanov post-Petrine Russia with a truly Orthodox state. Although in the first and in the second case there is obvious geopolitical continuity. 
In our time, when there is neither tsarist nor Soviet Russia, but there is a country dying and crippled, plundered and sold to the West, our eternal enemy, we are able to comprehend the whole geopolitical history of Orthodoxy with an impartial and objective view and identify its constants, which we should draw on the tablets of the new statehood of power, wishing to be called "Russian." 
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Chapter 5 - Threat of the West
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Chapter 2 - State and Territory
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