Chapter 4 - The new geopolitical order of the South

4.1 “The New Geopolitical Order” of the South

The geopolitics of the southern regions (as well as the western ones) is connected with the planetary mission of Russia-Eurasia to an even greater extent than the problems of the North and East. If even when considering the North and the East, which belong geopolitically to the Russian territories, the foreign policy factor arose constantly, in the case of analyzing the problems of the South (as well as the West), it’s simply not worth talking about “internal geopolitics” of Russia, since all the domestic Russian realities are so connected with foreign policy here that their separation is simply impossible without completely violating the rigor of the overall geopolitical picture.

With respect to the South, the "geographical axis of history" has only one imperative geopolitical expansion up to the shores of the Indian Ocean. This means the centrality and uniqueness of meridian development, the unambiguous domination of the North-South axis. From a geopolitical point of view, the entire space separating Russian territory from the southern coastline of Eurasia is a strip whose area must be reduced to zero. The very fact of the existence of rimland, which is not a line, but a strip, is an expression of thalassocratic influence opposite to the basic impulse of continental integration. If the rimland of Eurasia in the north and east of Russia is reduced to zero volume, and the continent here is geopolitically complete (the only thing left is to maintain the positional status quo,warning in advance the possibility of turning the line into a strip under the influence of a thalassocratic impulse), then rimland in the south (and west) is an open problem. In the east and north, Russia rimland has an actual line, but a potential line, and in the south and west, on the contrary, an actual line, but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of things and precautionary geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, a totally “offensive” strategy.

In the south of all Eurasia, Russia must establish a “new geopolitical order” based on the principle of continental integration. Therefore, all the existing political formations of the South, the Islamic countries, India, China, Indochina should obviously be regarded as a theater of continental positional maneuvers, whose ultimate task is to strategically tightly connect all these intermediate regions with the Eurasian Center and Moscow.

This implies the concept of “open rays” going from the Center to the periphery, which do not stop at the actual Russian borders, but must be drawn up to the southern ocean coast. Those segments of the “rays” that fall on Russian territories are relevant, those countries that are strategically in solidarity with Russia are semi-relevant, and those states that follow their own geopolitical path or (in the worst case) fall into the direct atlantist control zone have the potential by The general logic of Eurasian geopolitics in this direction comes down to ensuring that the entire length of the rays becomes relevant or semi-relevant.

On this basis, the entire coast of the Eurasian continent from Anatolia to Korea should be considered as a potential “Russian South”.

4.2 Zones and border mountains

The imperative of geopolitical expansion in a southerly direction also determines the composition structure of those areas that are part of the administrative borders of Russia or part of allied states (CIS). Therefore, the analysis of the periphery of actual and semi-actual geopolitical rays should not for a moment be distracted from the initial tendency dictated by the laws of geopolitics.

The “Russian South”, in a more limited sense, are the following zones:

  1. The North of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria;

  2. Moldova and Southern and Eastern Ukraine;

  3. Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory (port of Novorossiysk);

  4. The Caucasus;

  5. The eastern and northern coasts of the Caspian (the territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);

  6. Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;

  7. Mongolia.

Continental strategic control is established over these zones. But all of them should be considered as bases for further geopolitical expansion to the south, and not as “eternal” borders of Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the presence of coastal stripes not controlled by the heartland is a constant threat of reduction even of those territories that are currently quite tightly connected to the Center of Eurasia. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent political entities on the basis of the former Soviet republics provide an impressive example of how the refusal to expand outside the southern coast of the continent (the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan) inevitably entails the rollback of Moscow's reliable borders far north, deep into the continent. But the weakening of the continental presence never creates a vacuum or strengthening the sovereignty of the “liberated” territories,since their provincial status deliberately excludes their geopolitical autarchy. The thalassocratic influence of Atlantism (in one form or another) automatically takes the place of Moscow's tellurocratic influence.

Consequently, the structure of the entire inner belt of the “Russian South” should initially be considered as a potential offensive bridgehead.

However, the matter is complicated by the fact that almost all border territories fall on mountainous (often highland) regions.

In the north of the Balkan Peninsula it is the Balkan Mountains, east of the Caucasus, then the Kopetdag and Hindukush Ranges, then the Pamir, Tien Shan, Altai. The mountainous terrain of the southern border of Russia-Eurasia, which largely predetermined the entire history of the East, is currently one of the most important geopolitical trump cards of Atlantism. The ancient Indo-Europeans divided the entire Eurasian East into two components: northern Turan (all that is higher than the Eurasian ridge of the mountains) and southern Iran (lying below this ridge). In fact, this division strictly corresponds to the modern geopolitical terms heartland (Turan) and rimland (Iran). After several millennia, the southern front of Russia poses the same geopolitical problem that was characteristic of the dialectic of relations "steppe nomads against the settled farmers of Persia."

But in this case, the situation has changed dramatically in the sense that the settled Slavic northern Forest was added to the steppe Turan, balancing and fixing the dynamics of the Turanian nomads. Settled Indo-Europeans (Slavs) closed the steppe from the north with cultural forms that largely repeated the archetypes of the Iranian south. Russia as Eurasia, as a synthesis of Forest and Steppe, qualitatively surpasses Turan, and therefore, the Iranian problem (wider than non-Russian Central Asia) acquires a different civilizational and geopolitical meaning. This is especially evident since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which radically broke with the atlantic thalassocratic policy of the Shah regime.

All these geopolitical aspects suggest the need for a radically new approach to the problem of the “Eurasian mountains”, which should lose the function of the strategic border, become not a barrier to continental integration, but a bridge to it.

The need to change the function of the mountains in southern Russia (and its strategic range) is a pillar of future Eurasian geopolitics. Without such a preliminary operation, Eurasia will never achieve real world domination, moreover, it will never even come closer to a genuine equal dialogue with thalassocracy.

4.3 Balkans

Since the majority of the southern lands of Russia and its strategic range fall on lands that are racially, culturally, and religiously different from the Russian civilization (except for the Balkans and Ukraine), geopolitically, the axes must be strictly meridian. Hence the conclusion: all vertical (longitude) integration processes should be promoted and all horizontal (latitudinal), i.e. in a sphere ethnically and politically different from the actual Russian spaces, one should apply the principle directly opposite to the principle that dominates in the conditions of ethno-cultural homogeneity.

We outline the main forms of the geopolitical structure of the “Russian South” (in the broad sense), alternately considering all local geopolitical systems from west to east.

Balkan Peninsula. There are four special areas here:

  1. Bosnian-Croatian (the most western and Atlantic oriented, pure rimland);

  2. Serbian (located east and clearly Eurasian oriented);

  3. Bulgarian (even more eastern, having elements of the “Levantine version of rimland”, this model is most clearly represented by Turkey and continental Eurasian synthesis);

  4. Greek (Orthodox, but part of the Atlantic bloc).

The “new geopolitical order” (continental and Eurasian) in this area (as elsewhere) is based on the promotion of all integration processes along the North-South axis. This means that efforts should be made to strengthen the ties between Belgrade Athens and Sofia Athens. Since the entire Balkan region is a mosaic and extremely complex configuration, the project of the all-Slavic southern federation consisting of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbian Bosnia, which would be a theoretically ideal solution, is hardly feasible in the near future. Moreover, it involves a dangerous process of latitudinal integration, which is always problematic in such ethnically complex regions. Let us recall, for example, the fierce Balkan wars of the beginning of the century between the Orthodox states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and the constantly arising problem of Macedonia, which is the "apple of discord" within the potentially continental and Eurasian Orthodox powers. Therefore, the example of the medieval Serbian “empire” of Nemanichi can be taken as a positive geopolitical paradigm. Moreover, all the significant successes of Greece in global geopolitical projects (in particular, the conquest of Alexander the Great) were fed by energies coming from the north of the Balkans, the Macedonian dynasty, and the earlier Dorian type of Indo-European Sparta. Within the framework of a small model of the entire Balkan Peninsula, Serbs (and, in part, Bulgarians) represent a Eurasian impulse, act as carriers of the idea of ​​heartland. South of Greece, it is geopolitically stretched between this northern continental impulse and a stable historical identification with rimland.Therefore, all the unification integration projects of Greece with the north of the Balkans can contribute to the strengthening of intracontinental impulses in Greece, which could be based on confessional proximity with Orthodox Russia.

If in the distant future you can imagine a common Balkan Federation, Eurasian oriented, then the minimum geopolitical program can be formulated as the creation of an irregular rhombus Sofia Moscow Belgrade Athens (and again Sofia), in which two rays come from the Center: Russian-Serbian and Russian-Bulgarian, but they converge in Athens. Moreover, the issue of Macedonia could be resolved by granting it special status in order to remove the stumbling block between all three Orthodox Balkan and potentially Eurasian (to varying degrees) states. This logically implies the vital interest of Moscow in the problem of Macedonia.

If you look at the whole picture from the opposite point of view, from the position of the Atlantists, it will immediately become obvious that it is important for thalassocracy to give all geopolitical processes the exact opposite character.

Firstly, for the "sea power" it is important to support the pro-Atlantic forces in the north of the Balkans (Croats and Muslims), and in addition, to tear Serbia and Bulgaria from a geopolitical alliance with Greece. For this, it is most convenient to use Macedonia, which can destroy all continental projects in this region. And if you connect Turkey to the Bulgarian problem, i.e. to contribute to the improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian relations to the detriment of the Bulgarian-Russian, then the whole Eurasian continental policy here will be defeated. This must be taken into account by the geopolitics of Eurasia.

4.4 The problem of sovereign Ukraine

Next comes the Ukrainian question. The sovereignty of Ukraine is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it can easily provoke an armed conflict. Without the Black Sea coast from Izmail to Kerch, Russia receives such an extended coastal strip, really controlled by no one knows that its very existence as a normal and independent state is being called into question. The Black Sea is not a substitute for access to the “warm seas” and its geopolitical significance drops sharply due to the stable Atlantic control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, but it at least makes it possible to protect the central regions from the potential expansion of Turkish influence, being extremely convenient, reliable and inexpensive border.Therefore, the appearance of a new geopolitical entity on these lands (which, moreover, seeks to enter the Atlantic alliance) is an absolute anomaly, which could only be led by completely irresponsible, from a geopolitical point of view, steps.

Ukraine as an independent state with some territorial ambitions poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia, and without solving the Ukrainian problem, it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics. This does not mean that the cultural-linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited, and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to some extent, things were in the tsarist empire or under the USSR). But strategically, Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow in the south and west (although more on possible models of restructuring will be discussed in the chapter on the West).

The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow throughout its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhaz territories. It is possible to split up this whole zone arbitrarily according to ethnocultural grounds, providing ethnic and confessional autonomy to Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc., but all this only with absolute control of Moscow over the military and political situation. These sectors should be radically divorced from the thalassocratic influence of both coming from the west and from Turkey (or even Greece). The northern shore of the Black Sea should be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow.

4.5 Between the Black Sea and the Caspian

The Caucasus proper consists of two geopolitical levels: the North Caucasus and the territory of the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Closely adjacent to this sector is the entire area of ​​Russian lands from Taganrog to Astrakhan, i.e. all Russian lands located between the Black Sea and the Caspian, which also includes Kalmykia’s wedge.

This whole region is an extremely important strategic hub, since the peoples living in it have enormous social dynamics, ancient geopolitical traditions, and it itself directly borders on Atlantic Turkey, which strategically controls, for its part, the border zone, which, from view of the relief, belongs to a single space of the Caucasus mountain range.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of the Russian geopolitical space, and it is no coincidence that these territories have traditionally been the scene of brutal hostilities between Russia-heartland and the countries of rimland Turkey and Iran. In the first approximation, control over the Caucasus opens up access to the “warm seas”, and each (even the most insignificant) movement of the border to the south (or north) means a significant gain (or loss) of all continental strength, tellurocracy.

The three horizontal layers of this entire region, the Russian lands, the North Caucasus as part of Russia and the Caucasus proper, also have their potential continuation even further south. This additional, purely potential belt, located not only outside Russia but also the CIS, consists of South Azerbaijan (located on the territory of Iran) and the northern regions of Turkey, which are largely inhabited by Kurds and Armenians. The whole region presents the same ethnocultural problem for Turkey and Iran as the Caucasian ethnic groups that are (or were) part of Russia. Consequently, there are all objective prerequisites for expanding continental influence deeper into the Caucasian range.

So, between the Black Sea and the Caspian there are four levels or layers, suggesting a differentiated approach from the side of the Center.

The first stratum, actually Russian, should be connected as much as possible in latitudinal orientation, creating a rigid structure Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan. This is the most important link in the Russian space as a whole, since to the north it rests against the central part of Russia, and even further north into Arkhangelsk, the most important northern port and the potential capital of the “northern trapeze”. Due to the relatively close distances from the Central European part and due to the demographically dense population and technical development, the Rostov-on-Don triangle Volgograd Astrakhan is the most important outpost of Russia in the South. This is a kind of substitution of the Eurasian Center itself, a secondary center connected by a continuous territory with deep spaces. That is why this region should become the geopolitical core of the entire Caucasian strategy of Eurasia,and for this it should be strengthened technologically, strategically and intellectually. It is desirable to create here a special cohesive Russian zone, integrated administratively and politically.

However, some problems arise with the northern regions of Kalmykia, which, however, are quite poorly populated. It makes sense to include these northern steppe regions in a common integration belt, geopolitically “stretching” them directly between Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan in order to close the bottom triangle with a peak in Volgograd. This will reproduce geographically and geopolitically the borders of ancient Khazaria, which controlled this entire region at the beginning of the first millennium. We can arbitrarily call this geopolitical entity the "Khazar triangle."

When moving from a purely Russian zone of the “Khazar triangle”, which should follow a latitudinal (horizontal) logic, although closely connected with the north and with the Center itself (Moscow), the integration vector changes its character radically. The entire North Caucasus and everything that lies south of it should be subject exclusively to meridian orientation. The strategic centers of the “Khazar triangle” should develop independent geopolitical chains that are deployed strictly to the south. From Rostov through Krasnodar to Maykop, Sukhumi and Batumi. From Stavropol to Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze, Tskhinval and Tbilisi. From Astrakhan to Makhachkala.

Any latitudinal demarcation of the ethnic regions of Transcaucasia should be supported, while longitude integration, on the contrary, should be strengthened. So, it is important by any means to tear off the active separatist Chechnya from Dagestan (and Ingushetia), blocking access to the Caspian. If Chechnya is left only in the south of Georgia, it will be geopolitically controlled from all sides, and it will be possible to control it from the side of Orthodox Georgia. Partly, Dagestan and Ingushetia should also be tied to Georgia, which may lead to the creation of an autonomous North Caucasian zone, developed economically, but strategically completely controlled by Russia and Eurasian oriented. A general redistribution of the North Caucasus could also solve the Ossetian problem, since new ethnic entities (for example, united Ossetia) would lose the meaning of national-state entities,acquiring a purely ethnic and cultural, linguistic and religious meaning. Following the same meridian logic, it is important to link Abkhazia directly with Russia.

All these steps are aimed at the same geopolitical goal of strengthening the Eurasian tellurocratic complex and preparing its planetary triumph in a duel with Atlanticism. Therefore, this whole plan can be called the “new geopolitical order in the Caucasus”. It implies a rejection of the traditional approach to existing political entities as “nation-states,” that is, strictly fixed administrative entities with permanent borders and a complete power structure. The “new geopolitical order in the Caucasus” presupposes a complete redistribution of existing political realities and a transition from a model of relations between the state-state or nation-nation to a purely geopolitical system of the Center of the periphery, and the structure of the periphery should be determined not by political, but ethno-cultural differentiation.

This can be done through a plan to create a “Caucasian Federation”, which would include both the three Caucasian republics of the CIS and domestic autonomous entities. At the same time, the center would be inferior to the entire cultural and economic autarchy of this region, but would provide the most severe strategic centralism. This would lead to an extremely flexible system that would not be based on violence, occupation or uniformization of Caucasian diversity, but on the awareness of the unity and commonality of continental fate.

A special geopolitical role is played by Armenia, which is a traditional and reliable ally of Russia in the Caucasus. Armenia serves as the most important strategic base for preventing Turkish expansion of the north and east into the regions of the Central Asian Turkic world. On the contrary, in the offensive geopolitical aspect, it is important as an ethnocultural community, continuously continuing to the south, on the territory of Turkey, where a significant part of ancient Armenia and its main shrine, Mount Ararat, are located. Racial and linguistic kinship also connects Armenians with the Kurds, another important ethnic factor that can be used to provoke geopolitical upheavals within Turkey. At the same time, it is extremely important to create a land corridor that crosses the entire Caucasus and reliably connects Armenia with the "Khazar triangle".

Armenia is important in one more sense. Based on historical and ethnic affinity with Iran, it was Armenia that could serve as one of the most important links for the spread of the Eurasian impulse from the Center to Iranian rimland. This means the creation of the Moscow Yerevan Tehran axis.

Azerbaijan should be attached to Iran (and by no means to Turkey), emphasizing Shiism, ethnic affinity with Iranian South Azerbaijan and historical ties. Thus, the most important strategic beam Moscow Tehran through Yerevan would be duplicated by the Moscow Baku Tehran beam, forming a rhombus, largely symmetrical to the Balkan rhombus. In general, there are many geopolitical parallels between the Balkans and the Caucasus. And most importantly: it is here that the most important geopolitical law manifests itself most clearly, latitudinal processes provoke terrible conflicts, long-range connections lead to stability and sustainability. This is especially expressive in the Yugoslav war and in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh problem itself is somewhat similar to the problem of Macedonia. And therefore, in order to stabilize the entire region, Moscow should establish the most direct ties with Karabakh in order to make this territory a point of equilibrium for the entire Caucasian geopolitical system. For this, the Karabakh negotiations should optimally have four parties: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Iran, with the exception of all Atlantist participants, whose political presence in the region is inexpedient for geopolitical reasons.

4.6 The New Geopolitical Order in Central Asia

Central Asia is considered to be a huge fragment of the Eurasian land, stretching from the North Kazakhstan steppes to the coast of the Arabian Sea. From the former Soviet Central Asian republics, this zone extends through the Kopetdag and Pamir Ranges to the south to plain Iran and to the southeast to Afghanistan. Central Asia is that geopolitical space that, rather than everyone else, can bring heartland to its cherished goal to the Indian Ocean. If Moscow managed to win a positional war with thalassocracy in this direction, many parallel issues would automatically be resolved: integration into the Indian continental bloc, strategic support for Iraq against Turkey, direct corridor to the Middle East, etc. All this makes this area central to the issue of geopolitical restructuring of the Eurasian South.

Note that Central Asia shares a ridge of mountains not only politically and geopolitically, but also racially. The former Soviet zone of Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) is populated by Sunni Turks, the heirs of Turan, many of whom continue to be predominantly engaged in nomadism and animal husbandry. "Non-Soviet" Central Asia Iran, Afghanistan (and even ethno-culturally related Pakistan) is inhabited by settled Indo-Europeans. Thus, geopolitical unity has a distinct racial boundary.

This whole area is divided into three parts:

  1. Central Kazakhstan (south of the 50th parallel, since the lands included in the “Russian East” are located to the north of it);

  2. Desert Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and mountainous Kyrgyzstan

    (these are purely Turanian lands);

  3. Iran Afghanistan Pakistan India (this is Iran in the expanded sense of "Ariana", "land of the Aryans").

The new Eurasian order in Central Asia is based on linking all these lands from north to south with a rigid geopolitical and strategic axis. Moreover, as always in such cases, it is important to structure the space exclusively in the meridian direction, contributing to the longitudinal convergence of individual regions.

Starting from the north, we are talking about the connection of all of Kazakhstan with the Russians in the Southern Urals and Western Siberia. This connection should serve as the supporting structure of the entire Central Asian area. The consistent and thoughtful integration of Kazakhstan into a common continental bloc with Russia is the basis of all continental policy. In this case, the most important point from the beginning is the task of strictly interrupting any influence of Turkey on this region, hindering any projects of "Turanian" integration emanating from Atlantic Turkey and offering a purely latitudinal geopolitical development of the former "Soviet" Central Asia, opposed to the Indo-European North (Russia) and the Indo-European South (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India).Turanian integration is a direct antithesis of geopolitical Eurasianism and consists in splitting the tellurocratic forces into three components: western (European Russia), eastern (Russian South Siberia and the Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). A similar “tuninism” is intended to split the racial and geopolitical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe, giving rise to both the Russian State and the Great Russian ethnos, and with regard to Iran and Afghanistan, it tears apart the religious unity of the Islamic world. Proceeding from this, heartland should declare a rigid positional geopolitical war in Turkey and the carriers of "panturanism" in which Islamic Aryan Iran will be Russia's main ally. Central Asia should be “stretched” vertically between two global Indo-European realities between Russians and Persians.At the same time, every effort should be made to single out local autonomous cultural trends throughout the Turkic space, to support regionalist forces in the autonomous regions, to aggravate friction between clans, tribes, "uluses", etc. Everywhere in this area, one should try to close territories, districts, industrial complexes, economic cycles, strategic objects in territories located outside the Turkic area, or in a strictly meridian direction. So, for example, Karakalpakia in the west of Uzbekistan should not integrate territorially in the east (Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent), but in the north (Kazakhstan) and south (Turkmenistan). On the same principle, the border areas between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be restructured Samarkand,The Ferghana Valley is both historically and ethnically connected with the Tajik territories no less than with the Uzbeks. The same is true for southern Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan should become the geopolitical hinge of the entire Central Asian geopolitical strategy of tellurocracy. This area combines the most important aspects of the whole Russian “Drang nach Suden”, “jerk to the South”. Tajiks are Muslims of Indo-European descent, ethnically close to Iranians and Afghans. Those. they represent a fragment of the “Iranian” world in this region. At the same time, Tajikistan was part of Russia and the USSR, i.e. was integrated into the continental, Eurasian geopolitical system itself. Therefore, the fate of this small alpine country, ancient Sogdiana, symbolizes the success (or failure) of the establishment of a new Eurasian order in Central Asia.

The actual border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan should not be taken as a strict line. This is not a historical fact, but a geopolitical task, since it would be in the interests of the heartland to completely abolish any strict restrictions here, moving the strategic line far to the south, and rebuilding the entire intermediate area on the basis of ethno-cultural, tribal and regional borders. Afghanistan does not have a tradition of complete centralized statehood. It is inhabited by many nomadic and sedentary tribes (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.), linked more by religion (Islam) than by statehood and politics. Therefore, the geopolitical return of Russia to Afghanistan is inevitable and predetermined by geography itself. The only thing that needs to be relied upon is not so much on military power,how much for a well-thought-out geopolitical strategy, for the preparation of a conscious and voluntary strategic alliance on both sides, caused by the need for a common confrontation between thalassocracy, the "forces of the West", and "Atlanticism", which automatically brings Russians and Muslims together. Tajikistan plays the role of the main base in this process, and its territory becomes a geopolitical laboratory, in which two multidirectional impulses converge the Islamic impulse of the Indo-European Eurasian South and the Russian geopolitical impulse coming from heartland from the north. Here, in Tajikistan, in Dushanbe or in another city, a joint Russian-Islamic strategy for the reorganization of the more northern "Turan" should be developed. This land is called upon to work out a landmark decision to create a New Eurasia,in which the thesis about an accomplished synthesis between the Steppe and the northern Forest, on the one hand, and between the same Steppe (Turan) and Iran, on the other, would be finally and irrevocably fixed.

Thus, it is logical to draw another ray from the Eurasian Center: Moscow Dushanbe Kabul Tehran, along which an unprecedented geopolitical reality should take shape.

Part of Tajikistan Mountainous Badakhshan is located very close to Pakistan and India, which converge to almost the same point with China (Xinjiang). Despite the fact that these zones are almost impassable, since they are located very high in the Pamir mountains, the Gorno-Badakhshan region itself has a deep geopolitical meaning. It is populated by the Ismailis, an Islamic heretical sect, which is an expression of the most extreme Shiism, i.e. the most Indo-European (from a spiritual point of view) version of Islam. The Badakhshan Ismailis are settled near the Pakist regions, and this state (although officially Sunni) is ethnically a Hindu convert to Islam. And this indicates that they are certainly closer to Indo-European tendencies within the framework of this religion, if not frankly “Shiite”, then “cryptoshi”.Not far away is Indian Kashmir, also populated by Hindu Muslims and Shaivists. Uyghur Muslims inhabit the Xinjiang region in China. Therefore, the religious specifics of Badakhshan and its strategic position enable the heartland to actively participate in solving the most important geopolitical problems that converge just in this area, the Pakistan-Indian wars, the potential Uyghur Islamic separatism in China, the national liberation struggle in Tibet, the Sikh movement in somewhat more southern Punjab, etc. All threads of this critical knot of Asia converge in Tajikistan, and more precisely, in Badakhshan. From here the additional and independent axis Moscow Khorog (the capital of Badakhshan) suggests itself. Furthermore,since Badakhshan’s connection with the rest of Tajikistan is not very strong (ethno-religious and clan contradictions), Moscow should separate this region into a separate geopolitical reality like Macedonia or Karabakh, since the strategic importance of Khorog is central for a gigantic region that exceeds the scope not only of Tajikistan, but throughout Central Asia.

This entire complex area should be restructured under the most active influence of the “geographical axis of history” of Russia on the basis of the tellurocratic model, i.e. contrary to the plans that the thalassocratic Atlantic elements have in this regard. It is known that it was England that supported the separatist movement of Indian Muslims, which led to the secession of Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani conflicts are also beneficial for the Atlantists, as this allows them to strengthen their political and economic influence in both regions, taking advantage of geopolitical contradictions and making the whole region dependent on the military-strategic presence of Americans and British. Currently, Pakistan, India and China are steadily entering the thalassocrat-controlled rimland. The geopolitical role of Tajikistan and Badakhshan isin order to radically change this state of affairs and organize a Eurasian system of continental integration throughout this space. At the same time, in the ideological sphere it is extremely important to take into account the slightest ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic nuances, and in the sphere of military-strategic it is necessary to strive for tough and uncontested centralism.

In the political sense, the anti-Americanism of the fundamentalist Iran and the strict "neutrality" of India provide serious grounds for the success of the Eurasian strategy. The rest depends on the geopolitical will of Moscow and, more broadly, Russia-Eurasia.

4.7 The Fall of China

China is Russia's most dangerous geopolitical neighbor in the South. In some ways, his role is similar to Turkey. But if Turkey is a member of NATO frankly, and its strategic atlantism is obvious, then with China everything is more complicated.

China's geopolitics was initially dual. On the one hand, it belonged to rimland, the “coastal zone” of the Pacific Ocean (on the eastern side), and on the other, it never became a thalassocracy and, on the contrary, always focused on continental archetypes. Therefore, there is a strong political tradition to call China the “Middle Empire”, and this term characterizes the continental Tellurocratic formations. At the same time, China is separated from the Indian Ocean by the Indochina Peninsula, on which an inflorescence of states with an open thalassocratic orientation is located.

In the course of the development (colonization) of the West by the East, China gradually turned into a semi-colony with the last generation of the emperors of the Qing dynasty, the Marion with the exact pro-English government. From the beginning of the 19th century until 1949 (the CCP’s victory over the Kuomintang), China’s geopolitics followed purely Atlantic trends (while China did not act as an independent thalassocracy, but as the Eurasian coastal base of the West). The victory of the Communist Party changed the situation, and for a short time (1949 1958) China reoriented itself to Eurasian pro-Russian politics. However, due to historical traditions, the Eurasian line was soon abandoned, and China preferred "autarchy." It remained to wait for the moment when the Eurasian orientation weakened so much that the potential atlantism and the geopolitical identity of China as rimland would become obvious.This happened in the mid-70s, when China began active negotiations with representatives of the mondialist "Trilateral Commission." This meant a new entry of China into the structure of the Atlanticist geopolitics.

While not denying the possibility of China under certain circumstances again embarking on the path of the Eurasian Alliance, this should not be particularly counted on. Purely pragmatically, China is much more profitable to have contacts with the West than with Russia, which will not be able to contribute to the technological development of this country, and such a “friendship” will only bind China's freedom of geopolitical manipulation in the Far East, Mongolia and South Siberia. In addition, the demographic growth of China poses the problem of “free territories” before this country, and the lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia (almost unsettled) seem highly attractive in this perspective.

China is dangerous for Russia for two reasons as the geopolitical base of Atlantism and in itself, as a country of increased demographic density in search of "no-man’s spaces." In both cases, heartland has a positional threat in this case, the location of which is extremely dangerous. China occupies the lands located south of Lenaland.

In addition, China has a closed racial and cultural specificity, and in historically visible periods it never participated in Eurasian continental construction.

All these considerations, regardless of the political specifics, make China a potential geopolitical adversary of Russia in the South and East. This should be recognized as a geopolitical axiom. Therefore, the geopolitical task of Russia in relation to the easternmost sector of its “internal” southern belt is to maximize the zone of its influence to the south, creating the widest possible “border zone”. In the future, Eurasia should extend its influence to Indochina, but to achieve this through a mutually beneficial alliance is almost unbelievable. And this is the fundamental difference between China and Islamic Asia (with the exception of Turkey) and India. If the Eurasian alliance with other southern sectors of Eurasia should be based on mutual interests, i.e. be the result of a conscious and voluntary union,based on the realization of a common geopolitical mission, in the case of China we are talking about force-based positional geopolitical pressure, about provoking territorial disintegration, fragmentation, and political and administrative redistribution of the state. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical opponents. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to do harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to identify a common geopolitical goal.

Now it is easy to derive the priorities of Russia's “internal geopolitics” in the space from Badakhshan to Vladivostok.

The main model here is the separation of the north of Thai territories from more southern lands. Geopolitical analysis immediately provides serious reasons for this. Xinjiang, the oldest country with a long history of political autonomy, accounts for the northwest of China. Numerous states that succeeded each other historically existed here. Moreover, at the moment these lands are inhabited by the Uyghurs of the Turkic ethnic group professing Islam. The Chinese maintain control in these areas through direct force pressure, direct colonization, oppressing the local population and suppressing all its attempts to defend religious and ethnic autonomy. The ideas of the accession of Xinjiang to Russia already existed among the Russian emperors as part of the project for the development of Siberia. This line should be returned. South of Xinjiang, Kun Lun and Tibet extendwhere we are again faced with a similar situation Tibet is a separate country with a special population, a specific religion, and ancient political and ethnic traditions. Beijing’s power here is also artificial and based on direct violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in the beginning of the anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the belt of tellurocracy. This will be the most positive geopolitical decision and will create reliable protection for Russia even if China does not abandon anti-Eurasian geopolitical projects.Without Xinjiang and Tibet, China’s potential geopolitical breakthrough into Kazakhstan and Western Siberia becomes impossible. Moreover, not only the complete liberation of these territories from Chinese control, but even the first stages of destabilizing the situation in these regions will already be Russia's strategic gain.

To the east is the sector of Mongolia Russia's strategic ally. It is important here to act proactively and not to allow the very possibility of strengthening the Chinese factor in Mongolian politics. Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect southern Siberia from China. At the same time, Mongolia’s ties with Xinjiang and Tibet should be intensified in order to create the prerequisites for a new configuration of the entire region with a focus on the gradual displacement of China and its geopolitical influence. For this purpose, a project of the Mongol-Tibetan Federation can be put forward, which could also include Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia and the Altai Republic. The unity of the Lamaist tradition of these peoples for Moscow is an important tool for anti-Chinese geopolitical strategy.

The last zone of the southern zone is Manchuria territory located in the north-east of China. And here we are faced with a weak (for China) geopolitical link. In this territory there were also ancient states with a tradition of political independence. Already in the XX century, Japan again recreated the Manchu state with its capital in Harbin, which was the continental bridgehead for Japan's invasion of China. For Russia, the existence in Manchuria of a special political state that is not controlled by China is highly desirable. Since Japan itself is one of the potential geopolitical allies of Eurasia, efforts could be combined in this matter.

Tibet Xinjiang Mongolia Manchuria together constitute the security belt of Russia. The main task in this region is to make these lands controlled by my heartland, using the potential geopolitical allies of Russia India and Japan, as well as the local population suffering from Beijing dictatorship. For China itself, this belt is a strategic springboard for a potential “breakthrough to the North,” to Kazakhstan and Siberia. These are lands adjacent to Lenaland from the south, around which a positional geopolitical confrontation with the leading world forces will inevitably unfold. Russia should tear this bridgehead away from China, push China south and offer it, as a geopolitical compensation, the development along the North-South axis in the south direction of Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia.

4.8 From the Balkans to Manchuria

Eurasia must “push” the South throughout the space from the Balkan Peninsula to Northeast China. This entire belt is a strategically important zone of Russia's security. The peoples inhabiting different sectors of this space are ethnically, religiously, culturally diverse. But all, without exception, have elements that bring them closer to the heartland’s geopolitical formula. For some, this is Orthodoxy, for others, historical belonging to a single state, for third, ethnic and racial affinity, for fourth, the adversary’s community, for fifth, pragmatic calculation. Such a diversity of the South dictates the need for extremely flexible geopolitics and extremely developed argumentation, justifying the need for ties, alliances, etc. None of the criteria is a priority here. You cannot rely on only one of the factors of ethnos, religion,race, history, gain, etc. In each case, it should be done differently. At the same time, the highest criterion remains geopolitics and its laws, which should subordinate all other considerations to themselves, and not become only an instrument of foreign (or internal) policy based on some separate and independent principles. Only in this case Eurasia can achieve stability, and Russia reliably ensure its continental security and the implementation of its tellurocratic mission.