Chapter 5 - Threat of the West

5.1 Two West

The problem of organizing space in the West of Eurasia is the topic that forms the basis of all geopolitics as a science. Western Europe is the rimland of Eurasia, with rimland the most complete, unambiguous and historically identifiable. Regarding Russia itself as a heartland, the West as a whole represents the main planetary adversary in that sector of “coastal civilization”, which fully assumed the function of a complete thalassocracy and identified its historical fate with the sea. England was at the forefront of this process, but all other European countries that took the baton of industrialization, technical development and the value standards of the “trade system” also entered this thalassocratic ensemble sooner or later.

During the historical formation of the final geographical picture of the West, the primacy from the island of England passed to the continent of America, especially to the United States. Thus, the USA and the NATO bloc controlled by them became the maximum embodiment of thalassocracy in its strategic, ideological, economic, and cultural aspects.

Such a final geopolitical fixation of planetary forces places the pole of Atlanticism and thalassocracy behind the Atlantic, on the American continent. Europe itself (even Western, including England itself) from the center of thalassocracy becomes the “buffer zone”, “coastal belt”, and “strategic appendage” of the USA. Such a transfer of the thalassocratic axis overseas slightly changes the geopolitical configuration. If a century ago Europe (England and France) was the main opponent of Russia, then after the Second World War this region lost its independent strategic importance, turning into a strategic colony of the United States. Such a transformation strictly corresponds to that “view from the sea” that characterizes the typically colonial attitude to the mainland of any thalassocracy. Whereas previously the “coastal” nature of Europe was a potential characteristic,activated by a special geopolitical formation “the island of england”, now it exactly corresponds to the actual picture of the distribution of forces. The USA, the geopolitical reality that emerged from Europe as its almost artificial projection, became a completely independent pole, the West in the absolute sense of the word, turning Europe from a metropolis to a colony. All this is in full accordance with the classical logic of thalassocratic geopolitics.

Thus, at present, the geopolitical problem of the planetary West in the broadest sense is breaking up for Russia into two components: the West as America and the West as Europe. From a geopolitical point of view, these two realities have different meanings. The West as America is the total geopolitical opponent of Russia, the pole of the trend directly opposite Eurasia, the headquarters and center of Atlantism. The positional geopolitical war with America has been and continues to be the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics, beginning in the middle of the 20th century, when the role of the United States became obvious. In this regard, the heartland’s position is clear, it is necessary to counteract the US Atlantic geopolitics at all levels and in all regions of the earth, trying to weaken, demoralize, deceive and, ultimately, defeat the enemy.At the same time, it is especially important to bring geopolitical disorder into intra-American reality, encouraging all kinds of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements of extremist, racist, sectarian groups, destabilizing internal political processes in the United States. At the same time, it makes sense to support isolationist tendencies in American politics, the theses of those (often right-republican) circles who believe that the United States should limit itself to its internal problems. This state of affairs of Russia is highly beneficial, even if "isolationism" will be carried out in the framework of the original version of the Monroe Doctrine if the US limits its influence to two Americas. This does not mean at all that Eurasia should at the same time refuse to destabilize the Latin American world, striving to bring certain regions out of US control. All levels of geopolitical pressure on the United States should be involved simultaneously, just as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlantism simultaneously “sponsors” the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of Russia's regionalization its progressive decay up to complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and justified. All this is the central task of Russia's "external geopolitics" with respect to the United States, so a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

The second reality, also denoted by the term "West", has a different meaning. This is Europe, the geopolitical meaning of which has changed dramatically in recent decades. Being traditionally a metropolis for other parts of the planet, Europe first found itself in a situation of a colony of strategic, cultural, economic, political, etc. American colonialism differs from the more explicit and rigid forms of the past, but its meaning remains the same. Europe at the moment does not have its own geopolitics and its own geographical will; its functions are limited to the fact that it serves as an auxiliary base for the United States in Eurasia and the site of the most likely conflict with Eurasia. This situation automatically leads to the fact that the anti-American line becomes a common geopolitical alternative to European states, combining them with a single project,which never existed before. The unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as a whole and independent organism, claiming to regain its historical significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be either Russian or American. After the end of the Cold War, this will manifested itself in its entirety.

Now the question arises: what, in general terms, is the attitude of Eurasia towards its western peninsula?

From a purely geopolitical point of view, Eurasia is clearly interested in bringing Europe out of the control of Atlantism, the United States. This is a priority. In the West, Russia should have maritime borders; this is a strategic imperative of the geopolitical development of Eurasia. It is the absence of such borders, the presence instead of them of a land line that crosses Europe in the middle, artificially and forcibly, ultimately led to the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Therefore, the task is not to repeat mistakes and correct the situation. Eurasia will only be free from Sea Power when the oceans will become its strategic borders in the North, East, South and West as in the case of America. Only then will the duel of civilizations proceed on an equal footing.

Therefore, Russia has two options, either the military occupation of Europe, or such a reorganization of the European space that will make this geopolitical sector a reliable strategic alliance of Moscow, preserving its sovereignty, autonomy and autarchy. The first option is so unrealistic that it should not be discussed seriously. The second option is complicated, but feasible, since half a century spent by Europe in the position of an American colony left a serious mark in European consciousness.

Friendly Europe as a strategic ally of Russia can arise only if it is united. Otherwise, the Atlantic adversary will find many ways to bring crushing and schism into the European bloc, provoking a conflict similar to the two world wars. Therefore, Moscow should contribute as much as possible to European unification, especially by supporting the Central European states, primarily Germany. The alliance of Germany with France, the axis of Paris Berlin (De Gaulle's project), is the backbone around which it is most logical to build the body of New Europe. Germany and France have a strong anti-Atlantic political tradition (both right and left political movements). Being potential and hidden for the time being, at some point she will declare herself in all her voice.Moscow should be guided by this line right now, without waiting for the final development of events.

Moscow’s task is to wrest Europe from the control of the United States (NATO), facilitate its unification, and strengthen integration ties with Central Europe under the sign of the main foreign policy axis of Moscow Berlin. Eurasia needs an allied friendly Europe. From a military point of view, it will not pose a serious threat (without the USA) for a long time, and economic cooperation with neutral Europe will be able to solve most of the technological problems of Russia and Asia in exchange for resources and strategic military partnership.

Based on this foreign geopolitical task, one should analyze the domestic political situation of Russia in its western regions.

5.2 Destroy the “sanitary cordon”

The basic formula for analyzing the geopolitics of the “Russian West” is the principle: “European Europe, Russian Russia”. Here, in general, one should act in the same way as in the case of the Islamic world, new borders are inevitable, some regions should be divided again, but in all cases the main task remains to create friendly neutral entities in the West, with maximum ethnocultural, economic and social freedom but with strategic dependence on Moscow. The task is to “Finlandize” the whole of Europe as much as possible, but one must begin with the reorganization of the spaces immediately adjacent directly to Russia.

Here a complex problem immediately arises: the “sanitary cordon”. Atlantist geopolitics are well aware of the strategic danger of the alliance between Russia and Europe (especially Germany) and traditionally seek to prevent this in every possible way. The most effective method of thalassocracy is the “sanitary cordon”, i.e. a strip of several border states hostile to both its eastern and western neighbors, and directly related to the Atlantic pole. The role of such a “sanitary cordon” is traditionally played by Poland and the East European countries located south of Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc. The idea of ​​such a “cordon” was developed by the geopolitician Mackinder and was very successfully implemented at the beginning of the century and before the Second World War. And in both cases, the goal was achieved in the end,between the two continentalist powers, Russia and Germany, a conflict ensued, as a result of which the Atlantists got strategic victories. America owes its place at the head of the West precisely to two world wars that bled Europe and whether Germany and Russia (the main rivals of the Atlanticism) were especially depleted.

Obviously, such a “sanitary cordon” will arise even now, created from small, embittered, historically irresponsible peoples and states, with manic claims and servile dependence on the thalassocratic West.

We are talking about the emergence of a geopolitical strip between the Baltic and the Black Sea, consisting of states that cannot enter Europe as a full-fledged component, but are strongly repelled by Moscow and Eurasia. The applicants for the members of the new “sanitary cordon” are the Baltic peoples (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians), Poland (including western Prussia), Belarus (the Catholic anti-Eurasian minority is lobbying for this idea), Ukraine (especially the Western Uniate Church), Hungary, Romania ( also influenced by the Uniates), Czech Republic and Slovakia. It can be seen that almost everywhere we are talking about the Catholic sector of Eastern Europe, which traditionally belonged to the zone of influence of the West. At the same time, we are dealing with the same countries that have acted more than once in geopolitical history as levers of destruction of the continental formations of the Russian Empire,Austro-Hungarian Empire, recently the USSR.

The task of Eurasia is that this cordon does not exist. This is in the interests of both Europe and Russia. These entities themselves, if we consider them as state entities, are untenable, ethnically and religiously contradictory, strategically and economically underdeveloped, and devoid of resources. In other words, these fictitious states make sense only as strategic zones artificially supported by Atlanticism. Everywhere there are factors that tie them to Eurasia (either Orthodoxy, or awareness of Slavic kinship, or the presence of the Russian population, or historical proximity, or several components at once, etc.), but there are also opposite factors that bring them closer to the West (Catholicism , uniatism, ethnic differentness, political traditions of sovereignty, etc.). So far, these formations are something integral,they cannot prefer either of the two orientations, and that is precisely why they become, in the full sense of the word, a “sanitary cordon”. Integration with the East is hindered by some elements, integration with the West by others. Hence the constant internal and external instability provoked by these countries, which plays into the hands of the thalasso and is a constant obstacle to Eurasian geopolitics and the continental bloc.

The only way to eliminate the “sanitary cordon” is to completely redistribute state neoplasms based on purely geopolitical factors. This does not have to automatically mean the annexation of territories to other states. It may be about creating in place of the states of federations or several states, whose geopolitical orientation will, however, be unambiguous. It will be easier for small entities, ethnically, culturally and religiously, to integrate into large geopolitical blocs, and if there are strong allied relations between Russia and Europe, the new borders will not mean a real threshold, a break. Moreover, only the absence of a “sanitary cordon” can make these pan-Eurasian relations normal, turn the space from Dublin to Vladivostok into a zone of Eurasian cooperation,cooperation and strategic partnership.

5.3 Baltic Federation

Let us consider in more detail the entire western belt adjacent to Russia. All space is divided into several sectors. To the north lies the Scandinavian belt, extending from Norway to Finland. With regard to Finland, we examined the general geopolitical project in the chapter on the North. Here we are talking about creating a Karelian-Finnish ethno-territorial entity with maximum cultural autonomy, but strategic integration into the Eurasian bloc. Norway and Sweden, as well as the Baltic republics, belong to a different geopolitical context, broader than the Karelian-Finnish problems.

Here we are faced with a more general topic of geopolitics of the Baltic and Scandinavia. In this case, it would be most convenient to follow the Swedish geopolitician Rudolf Cellen (who invented the term “geopolitics”) and consider the entire Baltic region as a northern extension of Central Europe, structured around Germany. Chellen believed that Scandinavian geopolitics could have no other development than a strategic union with Germany, based on ethnic, cultural and geographical community. But the connecting element of the whole structure should be the Prussian German state with the dominance of the Protestant denomination common to the Scandinavians. The Protestant-Scandinavian bloc should be the northern extension of Prussia, Berlin. Therefore, all this space, having begun to realize itself as a whole,cannot do without the geopolitical restoration of Prussian unity. Prussia does not exist at the moment, its lands are distributed between Germany, Poland and Russia. Consequently, the most important prerequisite for the creation of a “neutral” politically and Moscow-friendly Baltic Federation is absent. Hence the practical impossibility of organizing this region in accordance with Eurasian principles.

At a purely theoretical level, the problem is solved in two stages:

  1. A new ethno-confessional space is being recreated within the framework of historical Prussia. The initiators are Moscow and Berlin. This implies the loyalty of the axial figure referred to in relation to Russia, which will give this education life, losing some of the Prussian lands acquired during the Second World War (Kaliningrad Region).

  2. Around Prussia, the process of strategic unification of the Baltic states into a single bloc begins. The block includes Norway, Sweden, Germany, Estonia, Finland-Karelia, Denmark, possibly Holland. Special status is delegated to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. A prerequisite is the withdrawal of all countries from NATO and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Baltic. In the future, strategic control passes to Moscow and the Armed Forces of “neutral” Europe, i.e. to the Eurasian defense complex.

The only weak elements in this system are Poland and Lithuania, where Catholicism is the predominant denomination. These lands were the main lever of thalassocratic geopolitics directed against Eurasia and the possibility of creating a continental bloc. Moreover, in history there is a precedent for the significant political independence of the Polish-Lithuanian principality, and some historians (in particular, Spengler) even talked about the existence of a special “Baltic civilization”, geographically coinciding, in general terms, with the historical borders of Poland and Lithuania. Only certain historical conditions did not allow this civilization to develop completely and made it “abortive” (Spengler's term). Admittedly, this problem does not have a positive solution at all, as it is formulated as follows:either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle to pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with an axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocks, and it will be divided and crushed in the bud. Any Catholic-based integration in this region will create tension both in relation to the East (Moscow), and in relation to the North (the Protestant world of Scandinavia), and in relation to the West (Germany). Consequently, in Poland and Lithuania, the main geopolitical partner of Eurasia should be forces that insist on the non-Catholic orientation of the policies of these countries, supporters of secular "social democracy", "neopagans", "ethnocentre", Protestant, Orthodox religious circles, ethnic minorities. Besides,ethnic tension in Polish-Lithuanian relations is an extremely valuable element that should be used and, if possible, exacerbated.

If the reconstruction of Prussia would solve, for the most part, the problems with Poland, which in such a situation would have remained only the path to the south (since the Baltic region would be under German-Russian control), then with Lithuania the situation is even more complicated, since it the northernmost fragment of the Catholic world, has a long coastline in the Baltic and separates the Russian space from the northern end of Central Europe, not belonging to either one or the other world. It is obvious that the Atlantist geopolitics will not fail to take advantage of this circumstance and try to make Lithuania the cause of discord and the main obstacle to the reorganization of Europe. It is only partially possible to limit the negative consequences of Lithuania’s geopolitical location for the Eurasian project,reinforcing the strategic unity of all this range and striving to close it from the north-west through the Swedish-Danish link.

5.4 Slavic Catholics enter Central Europe

Descending south, we find ourselves in the Slavic-Catholic or Uniate region, which extends from Poland through Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Volyn, Galicia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Croatia and Slovenia in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. Hungary, Austria and Bavaria adjoin this space geopolitically, inhabited, respectively, by Catholics Hungarians and Germans. The Uniate Church also exists in Orthodox Romania. This predominantly Slavic space, despite its ethnic and racial kinship with Russia, never identified itself with the East Slavic statehood, and to an even lesser extent with the Eurasian empire of Moscow. Ethnic kinship in this case is not a sufficient basis for geopolitical integration.The ambiguity of this factor historically gave rise to conflicts and wars between Russia and Germany (wider than Europe), and hindered the organic and consistent organization of the geopolitical ensemble of Central Europe.

Culturally Slavic Catholic peoples developed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and ethnic friction with it, which led to collapse, arose only when Vienna itself lost its idea of ​​its supranational imperial geopolitical mission and became more and more identified with the ethnic "Germanism" . The only exception is Bohemia, Moravia and Bosnia, where the Slavs initially recognized their spiritual difference from the German-Catholic principle, which was expressed in Hussite wars, reformation fermentations and outbursts of sectarianism (in the case of Bosnian Bogomil Serbs). From a geopolitical point of view, all these peoples belong to Central Europe and should be structured around the Central European Center, which Germany naturally is.A direct impact on these areas of Moscow can never become a priority, since ethnic closeness only emphasizes cultural, historical and spiritual-religious differences.

Based on these considerations, Russia needs to abandon direct control over the countries of Eastern Europe, leaving them to German control. At the same time, Moscow should not only passively wait until this happens by itself, but actively contribute to organic processes in this area in order to become together with Berlin the initiator and implementer of the whole process, thereby acquiring a geopolitical share in solving all delicate problems. In this case, one will have to abandon domination over some regions of Western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, compactly populated by Uniates and Catholics. The same applies to some regions of Belarus. Refusing direct political dominance over some territories, in return, Moscow should receive the right to strategic presence on the westernmost borders of the entire Central European region.This is the meaning of the entire reorganization of Eastern Europe. Moscow should go on providing the entire Catholic Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone on the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons we have already said that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by both sides (Russia and Germany)), with the complete exclusion of the West, the thalasso kratiya, since otherwise this whole belt will get the opposite meaning, turning into a "sanitary cordon" (although it is created just in order to prevent the occurrence of such a "cordon").

5.5 Association of Belarus and Great Russia

On a map that takes into account the confessional structure of Eastern Europe, one can clearly see how, as they move south, the Orthodox population is moving more and more westward, crowding the Catholic. Some Serbian lands reach the Adriatic coast, and in addition, there is a certain percentage of Orthodox among Albanians (the founder of independent Albania was the Orthodox priest Fan Noli).

These territories, which include Belarus, central Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, have a dual geopolitical nature, geographically they belong to the southern sector of Central Europe, and culturally and faithfully belong to Russia-Eurasia. The spiritual identity of these peoples consisted of opposing Islam in the south and Catholicism in the west, their national idea is inextricably linked with Orthodoxy. In such a situation, Moscow can neither fully delegate geopolitical control over the German region, nor declare its direct political influence on these countries. Moreover, in the Russian-Moldavian and Russian-Romanian relations (not to mention Ukraine), not everything is smooth. The closest historical contacts Russia has with Serbia, but it’s impossible to build integration tactics for the entire region on them,since Serbia also traditionally has rather strained relations with its Orthodox neighbors. In addition, we highlighted the general picture of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Balkans in the chapter on the South. Here we should more specifically consider the territories occupied by Belarus, Ukraine and Romania (with Moldova).

With regard to Belarus, the geopolitical picture is quite clear. With the exception of a small part of the Polonized Belarusians (Catholics and Uniates, as well as Poles), the vast majority of the population clearly belongs to the Russian space and should be considered as a subject of the central Eurasian ethnic group, i.e. as "Russians" in the cultural, religious, ethnic and geopolitical senses. Linguistic specificity, some ethnic and cultural peculiarities do not change the overall picture. Therefore, Moscow should integrate with Belarus in the closest way, while not forgetting that the promotion of the cultural and linguistic identity of Belarusians is an important positive moment in the whole system of Eurasian integration. With regard to ethnic groups belonging to a single state, this principle should be observed as strictlyas with border nations or neighbors. The only painful step in Belarus that must be taken to prevent centrifugal and disruptive tendencies is to separate out into a special administrative category certain areas compactly populated by Catholics and Uniates up to granting them significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire to keep Belarus at all costs wholly under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that in it and from its western neighbors Russia will have smoldering embers of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) may be decided in the interests of all interested parties.

Belarus should be considered as part of Russia, and therefore integration with it should be carried out along the West-East axis, which is a priority in all cases of the internal organization of an ethnically homogeneous space. The real western border of Russia should lie much westward, therefore, in a full-fledged geopolitical picture, the Belarusian lands are more likely to belong to the central region than to the western outskirts.

5.6 Geopolitical decomposition of Ukraine

The issue of Ukraine is more complicated, although the model of the geopolitical composition of this state is very similar. True, the geopolitical scale of Ukraine plays an important role here, which is represented by a gigantic territorial entity that exceeds the size of many large European powers. The separatism and tendencies of political sovereignty are incomparably more active in Ukraine. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has neither a particular cultural message of universal significance, nor geographical uniqueness, nor ethnic exclusivity. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name “Ukraine”, i.e. “Outskirts”, “border territories”. In the era of Kievan Rus, the territory of modern Ukraine was the center of statehood of the Eastern Slavs,for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts ("Ukraine"), and Novgorod the north. But as Russia turned from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the largest centers radically changed their meaning. Moscow became the capital of the empire, and Kiev turned into a secondary center, in which Eurasian and Central European influences converged. There was no question of any synthesis of cultures. Most likely, the more archaic, purely Russian Orthodox strata were subjected to the dynamic more “modernist" influence of Western Europe, especially through Poland in the west and Austria-Hungary in the southwest. Of course, Ukrainian culture and language are peculiar and unique, but they are deprived of any universal significance. Cossack settlements that formed, to a large extent,Ukrainian ethnic group, distinguished by independence, a special ethical, economic and social structure. But all these elements are not enough for geopolitical independence, and the popamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc.) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

For this reason, the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its modern borders) can only make sense as a “sanitary cordon,” since elements opposite in their geopolitical orientation will not allow this country to fully join either the eastern or western bloc, i.e. neither to Russia-Eurasia, nor to Central Europe. All this dooms Ukraine to a puppet existence and geopolitical service of the thalassocratic strategy in Europe. In this sense, the role of Ukraine is similar to the role of the Baltic republics. On this basis, at one time, seriously discussed the project of creating the "Black Sea-Baltic Federation", i.e. a typical “sanitary cordon” of subversive geopolitical formation, which serves to provoke instability in Eastern Europe and to prepare the prerequisites for a series of armed conflicts.The existence of Ukraine within its current borders and with the current status of a “sovereign state” is identical to delivering a monstrous blow to Russia's geopolitical security, which is tantamount to an invasion of its territory.

The continued existence of unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones corresponding to the gamut of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities.

1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of ​​Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. All this territory is certainly close to Russia, culturally, historically, ethnically, religiously connected with it. This well-developed, technically developed region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridional integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkiv region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) proper Russian territories and the spread of the structure to the south.

2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity traditionally distinguished by ethnic mosaicism. Little Russians, Great Russians, and Crimean Tatars are resettled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and are three geopolitical impulses that are quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are emphasized pro-Moscow (more aggressively than in the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, by contrast, are extremely nationalistic. Crimean Tatars are generally oriented more towards Turkey and are quite hostile to Russia. There can be no talk of taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical opponent of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either.The direct accession of Crimea to Russia will provoke an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and will create problems of integration of this peninsula into the Russian system through Ukrainian territories, which is hardly realistic at all. It is also impossible to leave Crimea to “sovereign Ukraine”, since this poses a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and creates ethnic tension in Crimea itself. Taking all these considerations into account, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control of Moscow, but taking into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethnocultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.

3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another finished region, where the Little Russian ethnos and language are ethnically dominant, but Orthodoxy is the predominant denomination. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and certainly included in the Eurasian geopolitical system.

4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North, this is Volyn, a separate region, south of the Lviv region (Galicia), further south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Besarabia. All these regions are fairly independent regions. Uniates and Catholics prevail in Volyn; this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. Almost the same picture in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southern lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are populated by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians alternate with Romanians and Moldavians. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt,diverging from Great Russia to the Balkans to Serbia. The entire sector from Besarabia to Odessa should be attributed to the Central Ukrainian geopolitical space, therefore it is more logical to include it in the meridian left-bank zone of the Dnieper, the western border of which extends from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk along the North South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.

Thus, Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of this concept, consists of three regions of Volyn and Galicia and Transcarpathia. Being geographically close, they differ in relief (Transcarpathia is a mountain range, like Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These areas, which today are actively influencing the general political atmosphere of Ukraine, actively pursuing an anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be provided with a significant degree of autonomy (up to the political one) in order to tear off these "subversive" territories from the Orthodox and generally pro-Russian pan-Ukrainian space as central so eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the place of passage of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border.This strategic border should lie much to the west, at least at the western tip of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the whole geopolitical restructuring of this region is undertaken, since, acting as the initiator of geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition that this entire area be removed from under the Atlantic control and the creation on this site of a complex of Eurasian continental defense, consisting of strategic military cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole.

Volyn, Galicia and Transcarpathia can constitute a common “Western Ukrainian Federation”, the degree of integration within which can be set arbitrarily depending on specific circumstances. The most important thing here is to draw a cultural and confessional border between Central Ukraine (actually Kiev land) and Western Ukraine in order to avoid the disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on Orthodox territories.

The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable spot in the western zone of Russia. If in other places the danger of the destruction of heartland’s geopolitical viability is potential, and the positional struggle for the Eurasian geopolitical system sets only preventive goals, then the existence of a “sovereign Ukraine” is at a geopolitical level a declaration of a geopolitical war in Russia (and this is not so much Ukraine itself, how much Atlantism and Sea Power). The point is not that Ukraine itself consciously chooses the role of the atlantist “sanitary cordon”, although in some cases this cannot but be a deliberate step, but that in practice it begins to fulfill this role,as long as it does not actively engage in integration processes with Moscow or (at least) does not break up into separate geopolitical components.

The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow. If the problems of the North and the "polar trapezoid" are connected with the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are important for the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy of reorganizing the Asian South is relevant for Russia, the geopolitics of the West and the center of this geopolitics, the “Ukrainian question”, requires Moscow to respond immediately, since it is a matter of delivering Russia a real strategic strike, which the “geographical axis of history” simply does not have the right to respond to.

Given that the simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not give a stable geopolitical system, even if this happens despite any objective obstacles, Moscow should be actively involved in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian space according to a unique logical and natural geopolitical model.

5.7 Romania and Moldova integration under what sign?

Romania and Moldova are two parts of a single geopolitical region, inhabited by a single Orthodox ethnic group, descendants of the Dacians, who speak the language of the Latin group and largely absorbed the cultural, linguistic and racial elements of the Slavic environment. From a geopolitical point of view, the integration of Romania and Moldova is inevitable, but Moscow should strive to carry out this association for its own purposes in order to include this space in the zone of its direct strategic control. The culture of Romania is generally a typical Orthodox model that directly connects these lands with Eurasia. The only obstacle to the perfect integration of these lands into Russia is the language factor and geopolitical proximity to the Catholic regions. Besides,in western Romania, Banat has a significant percentage of Hungarian Catholics and Romanian Uniates.

Through Romania, Moldova and Central Ukraine runs a continuous strip inhabited by Orthodox peoples, connecting the lands of Russia with Serbia, the outpost of Eurasia in the Balkans. It is in the interests of Eurasia to turn this entire region into a single strategic and cultural region into virtually one country. This requires Moscow to be the initiator of the Moldovan-Romanian integration, the sign of which should be initially defined as Orthodox and Eurasian. At the same time, it is important that the Slavic Orthodox peoples of Ukraine and Serbs close the Romanian Orthodox enclave from the east and from the west, thus ensuring the continuity of territorial integration based not only on ethnic, but on religious grounds and cultural kinship. However, such an "Orthodox bloc" from the Dniester to Montenegro,in the center of which a united Romania should be located, it should develop in cooperation with Berlin, which is provided with the more western part of Central Europe from Prussia through the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Hungary, and Austria, and then to Croatia, i.e. to the Adriatic. If we add to this the eastern ledge of Poland and East Prussia, which Germany takes north, the natural extension of Russia to the west in the Balkan region will be logical and acceptable, not violating the geopolitical balance of Central Europe, which geopolitically belongs to the sphere of influence of Germany.

5.8 Condition: soil, not blood

All these actions follow from the general picture of European geopolitics, in which the regions of Central Europe (under the auspices of Germany) and Western Europe in the narrow sense are clearly distinguished. Russia has no points of direct contact with Western Europe, therefore, the implementation of the Eurasian strategy in this region (of which France is a key element) depends on building a pan-European structure along the axis of Paris Paris. But the Eurasian factor in Western Europe cannot be directly the line of Moscow. Moscow speaks here only through Berlin, and Eurasian continentalist and anti-Atlanticist tendencies are described here by the single term “Germanophilia”. For the French, one cannot demand a more distinct “Eurasianism” than “Germanophilia”, since Western Europe comprehends heartland's problems through German continentalism.Russia, in this case, is a "geopolitical abstraction."

However, this does not mean at all that Russia should be indifferent to Western European problems. It is in her interests to bring all of Europe out of the Atlantic influence, which means that Moscow should actively promote the alignment of Western Europe with Central Europe, i.e. to Germany.

At the same time, Germany itself should initially put forward a fundamental requirement: all integration processes in Central Europe, where Berlin's geopolitical dominance is frank, as well as all transformations in Western Europe, which aim to orient European powers to Germany, should exclude the principle of ethnic domination of Germans in cultural political, confessional or ideological field. Europe should be European, and Central Europe Central European, i.e. the whole linguistic, ethnic and spiritual identity of the peoples of Europe should flourish and be encouraged by Berlin, whose priority should be exclusively geopolitical and social, and in no way racial. Moscow is also responsible for many Central European ethnic groups due to racial kinship with them (Slavs). Moreover, it is ethnocentrism and nationalThe racial arrogance of the Germans has repeatedly led to bloody conflicts in Europe. Throughout the geopolitical reorganization of Europe, Russia must act as a guarantor that Berlin will strictly separate geopolitics and race, “soil and blood”, in order to deliberately exclude tragedies similar to Hitler’s adventure. Any signs of German nationalism regarding the geopolitical reconstruction of Europe should be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes should be conducted on the basis of strict observance of the “rights of peoples”, the full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages.

Moscow must make the same demands on itself and on its allies. The ethnic principle should be encouraged and actively supported by the geopolitical center only in a positive aspect, as an affirmative reality, as a national self-identification. Of course, one cannot expect a complete disappearance of interethnic friction and the manifestation of the negative aspects of national self-affirmation, but just at this moment the principle of geopolitical centralism should be actively taking effect as the supra-ethnic arbiter, solving internal problems based on the vital political and strategic interests of the Eurasian whole.

This principle is universal for all regions in which the New Eurasian Order should be established, both internal for Russia and external. But in the case of the West, Europe, this is especially important, since ethnic problems in these spaces underlie all the most terrible conflicts that shook the 20th century.